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Editors

University Governance

Western European Comparative Perspectives

Chapter 10
Universities Steering between Stories and History[*]

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This last chapter brings us back to interpretation. An inadvertent observer reading governmental white papers from our seven countries could infer from their repertoire similarities[1] that convergence is on its way in Europe. Yet, by paying more attention to national histories of public policies implementation, the former chapter shows a paradoxical result: reforms of higher education (HE) in Western European countries have much in common and yet each is path dependent. In each of the countries studied, universities seem to have changed dramatically, although at various degrees, and exhibit new traits, compared to 25 years ago. The new traits are not stabilized, however: reforms continue everywhere. Change is still in process of redefining national higher education and research (HER) systems, in terms of their missions and operation. It is at least as evident as continuity. There is little difference in the pattern of high organizational turbulence in the HE systems between well known reform-prone countries such as those in Northern Europe, and supposedly rigid societies like France.

This significant shift from the expected pictures of high continuity, or conversely of radical reorganization, is as much due to top-down reform and shifts in steering

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as to traditional bottom-up and academically-driven forms of micro-institutional change in national specific contexts. Therefore it is indeed important to expand the traditional micro focus of much writing in the HE sector with an awareness of macro forces shaping the sector as a whole, bringing in the public management and political science literatures. This leads us to explore diversity using the more generic concepts of public policies developed in Chapter 1, in order to reincorporate HE as a case consistent with a general approach of key public services reform.

The first section draws upon the possible redefinitions of the role of the nation-state since the 1980s, describing how concrete changes identified in many other public sectors are also observable in HE. As for other sectors, HE exhibits specific national mixes on three vital characteristics of political systems: multilevel governmental steering, the strength of the nation-state and the vitality of democratic institutions.

The second section returns to the theoretical questions raised in the book introduction by raising the following question. How may the pattern and outcome of processes of reform and change during the last decades best be understood? How much can the New Public Management (NPM) and Network Governance (NG) narratives account for HE national reforms during the last 3 decades?

10.1 New Steering Patterns?

Until the 1980s, the vision of university governance referred to the mix of bureaucratic steering and self-governance specifically seen in professional bureaucracies. On the side of bureaucratic steering, public sector policies can be seen as a translation of political will to be implemented by ministries; such as centralization of rule formulation and resource allocation and administration in ministerial bureaus specialized per item; steering by substantial rules as a top-down frame of communication between ministries and universities. On the side of self-governance, prominent academics will play a major role at the central level in defining resources to be allocated, implement and adjust the rules, and the local implementation of the rules will be collegially defined and controlled. This model was rooted in the prevailing faith in the prosperous post-World War II Europe that governments were able to design and steer society, as well as in a strong belief that no one except themselves could impose on complex consultative structures and networks ensuring self-regulation based on professionals' ways of working. It usually did not interfere with stability of professional power distribution. The state steering capacity was never seriously challenged until the 1980s.

In the 1980s, the increasing disbelief in the governing power of the national state, together with the need to adjust public expenditures, led to reformulating the basic steering paradigm together with the methods of steering. The challenge of public policies is now to identify and solve public problems rather than administer resources. Potentially affected actors are numerous, heterogeneous and localized. Problem solving involves emerging processes that cannot be simply channelled by

top-down linear processes. Thus, decentralization is required for problems to be processed by their own actors and in their contexts (Thoenig, 2005).

Such a vision implies a complete new design of steering by public authorities (Neave and van Vught, 1991). It turns local entities into more managerially administered organizations by decentralizing micro-management, leaving room for strategy by restricting the hold of direct prescriptions. It thus excludes top-down guidance by substantial itemized rules and ex ante control. The basically asymmetric relationship between ministries as principals and universities as agents has to be reconsidered and reorganized. As a consequence, central ministries as well as local entities have to reorganize and build new tools to articulate ex ante strategy building at each level, processes of ex ante allocation and ex post evaluation. Steering tools have to become procedural and non coercive. Steering thus becomes indirect, using ex ante incentives and ex post performance measures.

This evolution is often described as a win-win game based on simplification of regulatory and administrative procedures and separation of policy-making and management. On one hand, universities are emancipated from finicky prescriptions and controls, and gain strategic capability. On the other hand, public authorities reduce top-down management costs and concentrate on their steering functions. The structure of this game creates its ambivalence. Ideally each partner may gain based on a symmetrical relationship maintained by negotiation between equal players. But it may strengthen the domination of one of the two players if asymmetry of power is not taken care of, either because public authorities maintain their control over resources, or because universities find new ways to escape controls by the new rules.

In principle the notion of a new steering system implies building coherence on its three complementary pillars. First, by pulling back the state from universities, as companies headquarters did from their "business units" to centre on their strategic functions; second, by transferring micro-management to HE "business units", third, by basing steering on ex ante incentives and ex post performance assessment. Therefore, new models of steering cannot be assessed without considering simultaneously reorganization of universities, ministries and rules. E. Ferlie, Ch. Musselin and G. Andresani have outlined three patterns of effective steering in the introduction: stronger multilevel steering, hollowing out of the state and revitalized democracy. We examine them below.

10.1.1 Stronger Multilevel Steering?

At the beginning of the 1980s, the question of autonomy was not perceived as a problem to the same extent in each country. But there were clear signs everywhere that universities are experiencing an organizational turn that pushes them from dependent administrative bodies or loosely coupled professional bureaucracies towards autonomously managed organizations. Indeed, we have observed an increasing formal autonomy, as recent and uncompleted as it may remain. We have pointed out that this increased autonomy has usually been pushed by internal

reorganizations such as mergers, reforms of personnel structure, changes in funding models, etc. Yet, increased formal autonomy per se does not directly convey changes in the internal balance of power.

Emphasis on strong management does not necessarily result in more power for universities. In particular, turning universities into tightly managed organizations implies turning presidents into formal gatekeepers for internal and external interactions involving strategic deliberation and operational decision-making. There are definite signs that their roles did change in this direction. Not only did presidents strengthen their individual role, but they also strengthened their ability of collective action, benchmarking, quality control, and lobbying thanks to the rising importance of their representative bodies or associations. Nevertheless, their position often remains a fiction in terms of leadership. This is most common in cases where the university leadership is too weak for the presidential team to control agendas in order to reposition the internal political order. Variations in leadership are not simply a national or regional matter. It also relates to the history of each individual university (Mignot-Gérard, 2007). In a given country or region, the same set of management tools usually meet individual university path dependencies that shape their individual histories.

Correspondingly, it is not rare that departments, faculties, research centres keep living their 'inner life' out of reach of presidential incentives and controls without even being aware of their own university's policies. The academic profession itself has not given up the ideal of collegial autonomy, although reinforcement of controls by assessment and full cost accounting certainly increases the pressure on the profession in Britain and the Netherlands, the two only countries where they are fully operative. Self-governance of research and predominance of the chair system did not disappear with the development of managerial programs even if it faded in the two countries and even though it weakened collegiality (Henkel, 2000). In most countries, segmentation of the academic body in terms of salaries and job content according to individual performance has not occurred, leaving traditional hierarchies and individual autonomy untouched. Yet, the rising role of labour contracts and the transformation of academics into university employees, where they occurred, might well strongly impact the profession in future.

While being given formal autonomy, universities sometimes adopt a defensive position by not implementing provisions that might otherwise contribute to organizing this autonomy in a more consistent way (decentralization of power to internal basic units, self evaluation based on autonomously built procedures, etc.). Such cases are largely witnessed in Italy as well as in France or Switzerland. Altogether, universities remain fragile actors.

Symmetrically, reorganization of the state has only started, even though some reform in the steering methods supports the notion of a managerialist turn of universities' steering. There is a strong sign that the "old administrative world" has hardly receded: new procedural rules have not eliminated old substantive ones in most countries.

Two major changes can be observed. First, public authorities search for better coordination. In Switzerland for instance, the federal government concentrates on

research, where new funding instruments such as priority projects improve cross-cantonal coordination and transparency of action between state and cantonal levels. New entities emerged during the 2000s, the function of which is to act as intermediaries to co-ordinate a shared steering between the Swiss Confederation and cantons. In Norway, the Network Norway council was created in 1998 to take care of coordination, but did not survive long. The second kind of change concerns externalization of several functions formerly embedded within central government, which is achieved by developing external agencies for research funding, quality assurance, evaluation, accreditation, etc. What occurred in the 1980s in the UK is a dramatic change in the distribution of functions at the government level that has been largely reproduced later in other countries. Research agencies have been present since long in the UK, Norway, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Lately, France has joined the 'agencification' process, with the creation of the ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche) in 2006, as a lever to by-pass traditional gatekeepers of allocation and evaluation such as CNRS. Quality assessment and accreditation agencies are more recent, but they are now present in all seven countries. Of course, this does not tell us anything on the way these agencies are implementing the missions they were given nor on the effective rearrangements they provoke in the established distribution of power.

At this stage however, it is not clear that the development of new intermediary bodies has taken place in all countries together with a reduction of ex ante control by ministries and radical changes in how they relate to universities. Implementation has often been blunted by power struggles. As a result, new agencies may support a new steering framework. The old one may as well digest them. We have mentioned above how peer review mechanisms made possible dissolution of performance-based programs in the Netherlands. We shall observe with interest the behaviour of the new French steering instruments in the coming years. Will the accreditation agency substitute new frames for assessment, evaluation and accreditation for the ones that already existed within research organizations? Or will it base its action on subsidiarity, and restrict itself to diffusion of good practices by inciting harmonization and coordination of performance indicators? Will research organizations keep or regain power in defining programs and controlling allocation mechanisms of the funding agency?

The concept of steering from a distance is linked to the mutation in the vision of the state, supposed to become "a catalyst, a coordinator, a facilitator" (De Vijlder and Mertens, 1990) rather than a planner, a controller or a censor, by "reduction of direct supervision, development of semi-structured interventionist policies, systems of positive and negative sanctions". In this new perspective, centralization of procedural steering at a distance would have transformed universities into one block agent, "HE organization", facing one block principal called "state" or "government". At the present time, each national HER sector exhibits a specific mix between both patterns, with a variable emphasis on both sets of tools. It is often the case that their transformations are less decisive than they claim to be when invoking principal-agent relationships.

Each country has developed, or is in the process of developing tools to enable government from a distance: indicators, plans, reporting, performance budgeting, etc.

Altogether, the sophistication reached in developing these tools varies widely across countries. Procedural instruments remain far from being fully developed. The case of indicators is a good example. They aim at opening the black box of professional bureaucracies by increasing transparency of resources, outputs and the relationship between both. Their very quality and usability certainly relate to various technicalities of their production and control process, but they also largely depend upon how much trust they inspire. Because they require commitment, their trustworthiness ultimately depends upon trust of rank and file academics in the dangers and advantages of transparency, especially during their first stages of development. Will they be used to constrain or to position and help negotiating? What positive and negative returns can self-governed collegial bodies expect from indicator-based transparency? Rank and file actors within universities may fear the impact of bureaucratic rationalization on traditional collegial values and habits, backing Michael Power when qualifying them as "technologies of distrust" (Power, 1997). Trust in and credibility of indicators depend upon how acceptable the vision of academic duties they provide, and consequently how threatening the steering system appears. It may explain why indicators have met or meet resistance in many countries, and why academics may try cheating on them or simply refuse to get seriously involved in gathering information: considering university functioning, they do not believe that credible indicators can technically be built, and considering public authorities organization, they do not believe that indicators can help positive rearrangement of their relationships with universities. As far as universities are concerned, very asymmetric top-down indicators strictly channeling resource allocation certainly build strong incentives, but may invite opportunistic responses and coerce mimetic postures rather than strategic behavior. Thus, they usually lead to ceaseless cat and mouse games between "principals" and "agents" in order to restrain perverse effects of agents' strategies, as testified in the UK, and to a lesser extent in other countries like Germany or France. More symmetrical relationships between public authorities and universities, based for instance on the negotiation of multidimensional positioning indicators with individual universities, may lead to a looser coupling between allocation and performance, but help diversifying and stabilizing genuine middle term universities' strategies.

Thus, the new instruments do not usually afford systematic means necessary for distant steering. The best example is that, even where indicators are established, total budgets usually remain only slightly impacted by performance evaluation. The rise of performance-based public funding can be quite impressive, as we have shown above. Yet, it only represents a limited share of universities' total budget when one considers both research and teaching, and includes salaries. Additionally, steering tools may be used in various ways. In the UK as well as in the Netherlands, they reinforce governmental control over higher education institutions and provide support for funding allocation. In other countries such as France, Italy or Switzerland, they are presently more used as a source of knowledge and visibility for universities than as a strong means for funding allocation.

It would be mistaking to consider that the creation of new instruments decreases substantial controls by the state. It clearly has not been the case in the UK, on the contrary: contrasting with the pre-existing "gentle attention" of government towards universities, the bureaucratic burden resulting from RAE, TQA,[2] etc. has been so high that it provoked a revolt of the vice-chancellors at the beginning of the 2000s in the UK. More generally, the non-fulfilment of new instruments may provide good reasons for public authorities not to abolish control by substantial rules. Indeed, the number of rules stemming from government remains impressive in most countries. Targets are monitored centrally, especially where the principal-agent model has been extensively implemented. Altogether, public authorities carry on fixing many rules of the game, such as conditions of recruitment and careers, structure and size of faculties, minimal standards for opening teaching programs, etc., as a counterpart to its dominant role in funding universities. As public organizations, universities remain highly dependent on the resources of national or regional public authorities that maintain an overwhelmingly dominant role in terms of prescriptive regulation. They can also impose their political will up to the point of dismissing rectors, as happened in 2007 in Switzerland. Reforms remain largely imposed by laws and decrees. Hierarchical control is still clearly visible if not dominant. The introduction of quasi-market rules appears to be difficult.

Beyond technical explanations, government by substantive rules remains rooted in a difficult and long lasting transition from distrust to trust between public authorities and universities, each hesitating to make irreversible moves that could induce loss of power. While governance by top-down prescription is based on distrust, bottom-up operation of public bodies based on distant steering and control requires trust between the two levels of government. It takes time to build trust. Each party has to demonstrate that it respects promises and agreements. It is difficult when reforms would require additional resources in order to produce positive returns, while budgetary shortages lead to suspect that decentralization actually means transfering the state's financial burden to universities. It is a common objection in Germany as well as in Norway or the Netherlands. It is a point strongly raised in France in relation to the 2007 act on autonomy, for instance regarding the transfer of real estate to universities. Experience shows that decentralization as such is insufficient to build trust relationships. It requires not only new administrative organizations, but also new administrative cultures on both sides. While reform in the UK has been largely based on coercive means, some aspects of the Dutch experience show that trust can be achieved when quality assessment is in the hands of universities before being approved by government. The same idea governs the use of indicators as positioning means for universities rather than direct steering means by public authorities.

These remarks show that the present-day organizational turn of universities did not usually clearly relate to an actual managerialist turn in multilevel governance. Continental European universities are far from being agents unilaterally steered by a "principal", although the landscape reveals quite a lot of diversity. It is difficult to infer from the present mix of new and old instruments that university steering is actually moving from the old bureaucratic pattern to a managerialist one.

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[2] The British sometimes use TQA for 'teaching quality assessment' in contrast to the RAE (Research Assessment Exercise).

Even where reforms have been pushed by managerialist visions, path-dependent systems revealed strong enough forces to resist implementation or transform expectations embedded into the most rational designs.

10.1.2 The Hollowing Out of the Nation-State?

While principal-agent visions of multilevel steering develop, the role of the state is challenged by the emergence of new actors able to influence HE system governance, the setting of new relevant levels of university governance, and the will to achieve complex objectives requiring the coordination of multiple actors. There is much talk everywhere about an increasing number of actors sharing interest in universities and supplying resources to involve universities in issues of interest for them: innovation, employment, citizenship, prestige, etc.

New actors come both from inside and outside universities. On the other hand, public actors and especially local public authorities share the floor with private actors such as company representatives or business authorities as members of university government bodies, as in Italy, UK, France or the Netherlands. Industrial associations advise the government on HE policies, formally as in Italy or informally in many other countries. Universities develop explicit attempts to strengthen ties with industry, local authorities and students in Norway, but also in France and Switzerland. Boards of trustees and HEIs' government bodies in some cases include representatives of local authorities and firms, as in France, Italy and the Netherlands. They integrate the state's decision making by taking into account economic and societal needs. Voluntary organizations, including trade unions, play a marginal role. Coming from inside universities, academia's involvement in governance increases, both within individual universities and in terms of political coordination between actors to influence and engage with public authorities' decisions. This often comes together with a reinforcement of the role given to presidents, vice-chancellors or rectors, or to university associations such as VSNU in the Netherlands, CPU in France, SUC in Switzerland, or NAHEI in Norway, aimed at coordinating actions and building collective visions to face the state. Students are also more directly involved in internal governance, e.g. in France, Italy, Switzerland and the UK. Students' feedback impacts both quality assurance system and university ranking in UK. Student involvement in internal governance is becoming more direct as well in France, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.

The relevance of multi-actor governance increased in the 2000s along with the differentiation of funding sources. The role of the EU is growing, thanks to the diversity of schemes included in the Framework Programmes (integrated projects, networks of excellence, technological platforms, Marie Curie actions, etc.), the recent creation of the ERC as funding agency for basic research, and the push towards integration through the ERA and EHEA frameworks. The EU level is both consolidating as an important level of funding for research as well as for professional training. Thus, competition for European funds between researchers and universities

becomes relevant for research centres and universities. Simultaneously, Europe has become a relevant level for building standards, for example through the Bologna process with the implementation of doctoral schools that formalize the content and the structure of doctoral studies. More extensively, within the Bologna process, with the goal of creating comparable degree structures, indicators are built to evaluate diplomas and research, and periodical assessment becomes an objective for the institutions (Ravinet, 2009). External accreditation may impact the national process of diploma recognition. Bibliometric assessment and peer review developed after the UK model, Italy, Norway, or the Netherlands for some disciplines, promote research-based university ranking.

Regional government also becomes more important in university governance. In Italy, changes in national laws allow a more prominent role of regions. Local representatives, especially in rich regions, may thus be involved in government university bodies. In the Netherlands, although local and regional governments remain unimportant legally, more attention is paid to the regional role of HE. In Switzerland, Cantons remain the principal authorities, but the role of the federal state increases. In Germany, Länder have always had the jurisdiction on universities, and cooperate to various degrees with the federal state and private foundations on research and innovation functions. They may also participate in the promotion of scientific clusters involving universities. In France, the share of local authorities in university funding has continuously grown since the 1980's first decentralization acts, in spite of the fact that research and HE matters remain under a national jurisdiction. Funding is framed by State-Region 5-year contracts targeting mostly real estate, as well as in specific regional policies taking care of scientific equipment, doctoral and postdoctoral scholarships, conferences, etc. Regions also contribute actively to new schemes such as cutting edge science thematic networks of excellence (RTRA), innovation clusters (pôles de compétitivité), as well as vocational or professional training in collaboration with local economic sector and public authorities.

These actors combine differently depending on national and local contexts, as well as on the functions considered. It is easy to show in the case of tuition fees, how changing the rules renews both sides of the interaction between university and its stakeholders. On the one hand, it keeps up competition between universities in order to attract good and/or foreign students (the Netherlands, the UK, Norway) because of their impact on funding. On the other hand, it changes the positioning of students towards universities on the basis of their value for money, i.e. their emerging role and power as customer. The importance of student judgment as users has turned into more involvement in internal governance in Italy, Switzerland and the UK, and more participation through quality assurance systems and less place for societal expression of opinion that dominated students' concerns in the 1970s and 1980s.

The involvement of multiple heterogeneous actors as potential university stakeholders questions the specificity of the state. Indeed, a new distribution of power between the various actors is observed. Vertically, stronger and more autonomous universities come together in associations to foster shared visions, share good practices and develop ways to defend their interest in relation to public authorities. So do professional managers, whose specialization, role and number grow within

universities. Jointly, the horizontal distribution of power within universities is changing. University governance bodies are enlarged to local representatives in Italy, to business and political authorities in the Netherlands, to industry, local authorities and students in Norway, students in Switzerland, and students as well as private stakeholders in the UK. Simultaneously these bodies often reorganize so as to clearly distinguish a board of trustees with decisional power from a senate representing a consultative academic parliament.

Is it sufficient though to consider the state as a stakeholder like others that now has to share its historical responsibilities for the steering of HE systems? To what extent can the state preserve its steering role in relation to universities? May multiple stakeholders balance to a certain extent the top-down initiatives of the state with new bottom-up approaches by universities that are taking advantage of resources offered by other stakeholders? To what extent do new stakeholders help overcome the growing legitimacy deficit of the welfare-state? Actually, observation across countries shows that state functions are repositioned rather than shrinking. The state does not lose functions, legitimacy and authority.

First, as far as the amount of funding is concerned, the contribution of non-state actors should not be over-estimated, even though marginal flexible contributions may well be decisive in the shaping of university projects, because so much of the state grant goes into (at the short term) fixed assets. But the national or regional public basic funding keeps up providing the major part of individual university resources in all countries, especially in continental Europe, though with a large variance between individual universities. So much so that the decreasing students' rate of growth since the beginning of the 1990s makes it less urgent to look for additional resources to fill the basic operating needs of universities, while university budgets rarely regress.

But financial matters are just part of the story. Other reasons explain why, with a few exceptions, the new actors that have emerged have not become able to counter-balance the role of states. First, they remain central in the traditional meaning of the term: they have not yet reorganized central bureaus according to a stakeholder vision of governance and it still largely governs by rules. Accountability devices are visible at the university level as a whole inasmuch as they relate to the use of public resources for training or research, and more so when the state pursues stronger public sector management by reinforcing the leadership capability of universities, as demonstrated by the UK in the index case. Policy tools have been devised to foster involvement of private actors in universities, but their contribution remains generally limited and often feared by academics defending education and research as public goods. Accountability requirements towards private stakeholders most often tend to be decentralized at the level of specific research centres or curricula, so that the part played by private actors in steering is hardly detectable in terms of policy building. Finally, the development of relationships with regions, wherever it occurs, which is more rarely than could be expected, in a roundabout way increases the legitimacy of the nation-state by pushing universities to focus more closely on local issues of public welfare.

Second, states remain dominant players because they carry on setting the rules of the game. Even though their way of doing is often, progressively but slowly, shifting from a substantive to a more procedural way, using a mix of authority and negotiation with stakeholders. The two last French acts on research and on universities (2006 and 2007) provide a good illustration of the government's strategic use of both resources in changing the rules of the game for HER organizations. Inasmuch as implementation of the rules is concerned, it appears that the state in several countries is building new mechanisms for dialogue and negotiation as to ensure the legitimacy of its participation in the university system. It shifts to a position that makes it more of an arbiter among stakeholders. In Italy for instance the research evaluation exercise developed by the government at the national level succeeded because of the involvement of actors, CRUI and CUN that were representative of the HEIs' views. The same occurs in the Netherlands. The rising legitimacy of a vision of universities as demand-driven makes it more difficult for national or regional states to neglect stakeholders. Yet, it remains difficult to identify homogeneous trends across countries as to the steering of public organizations such as universities.

Third, the move towards decentralization of micro-management indisputably increases the autonomy of universities. Yet, it develops jointly with a corresponding centralization of authority at the state level by means of governance tools for steering at a distance, even though it remains weak in most countries outside the UK and the Netherlands. The new governing tools are most often ambivalent: they bring about resources for universities to emerge or reinforce as collective actors relating to multiple stakeholders, as well as they build resources for stronger state steering.

Ultimately, the state does not loose authority, but shares responsibilities. The hollowing out of the nation-state certainly takes place if one considers the increasing number of actors taking part in HER steering and the increasing influence of new levels of steering (European and regional) relatively to the national one. Simultaneously, in most cases, this reorganization is managed by the state that "holds the ring", opens it to new players and defines the content of the relationships and responsibilities among these new players.

10.1.3   *Democratic Revitalization?*

How do new steering instruments impact the relationship between universities and civil society? Do they incite citizen participation in policy and management? Such an evolution would require pairing the traditional model of responsive public administration with collaborative public administration promoting trust in government through enhancing shared ideas, knowledge and power (de Leon, 2005). The state would maintain its position, but experience a substantial revision of the traditional bureaucratic forms of public administration. The revision could be carried out, for instance, by reinforcing democratic innovation and public participation in the decision-making process, by including representatives of civil society in government bodies and by defining the agenda in order to deal with societal needs and problems. How much is internal governance of public agencies influenced by external civil society? Such dynamics could break out of a policy in search of efficiency by participation, with

the idea that persons or groups involved in decision making are more likely to support the outcomes of processes they have been part of, especially in present times when citizens' level of education is much higher than previously. Such revisions can be observed as counter effects against excessive coercive use of new instruments for vertical steering, as it has been experienced in the UK or the Netherlands. The emphasis of the New Labour on university cooperation rather than competition can be seen as mitigation of the original British managerialist paradigm. In this way, government interests can be reshaped or transformed as a result of engaging in dialogue with other relevant actors. They can also be imposed from citizens' movements "inviting themselves" for instance in the arena of scientific expertise and research funding and standing up for values such as equity, security, society openness, respect of nature and mankind, etc. (Callon et al., 2001).

Several signs of such a process can be acknowledged in HE that could as well be interpreted as symptoms of the hollowing out of the state. Public participation and democratic renewal can also go with typical processes of managerialism such as devolution, partnership, policy evaluation and long-term capacity building.

There are many signs that multiplying stakeholders favours a new vitality in universities. Instruments such as technology assessment arenas, consensus conferences, hybrid forums, deliberative bodies, may involve stakeholders in decision-making. In the present period, they are not customary in the relationship between the universities as such and the state. Participation of stakeholders in decision-making has been described above, involving rising interaction with local stakeholders in wealthy regions, networking in education and research with innovative firms, etc. New stakeholders may be invited to joint counseling or decision-making bodies as described above. They can also enter the arena by successful lobbying, entailing their recognition as legitimate participants in deliberative bodies at the local or at the state level.

A new vitality of HEIs is quite a common trend, due to the general reinforcement of autonomy, to increased room for manoeuvre and to rising involvement of stakeholders, with different levels of effectiveness across countries. Differences are related mainly to constraints deriving from state rules and regulations. As to the agenda, the emphasis on applied research and "useful" teaching activities is diffusing in most countries. It certainly promotes interaction with economy and society, notwithstanding academics and citizens' rising concern about the long term functions of university in research and education.

Do these changes lead to internal democratization in university governance? Workplace democracy refers to participative decision-making by employees in organizational management (de Leon, 2005), with the purpose to enhancing satisfaction and thus effectiveness by increasing the internal flow of information. As mentioned above, hard data do not confirm that this trend is extensively at work in European universities. Internal democratization processes may exist here and there to a limited extent, by incorporation of stakeholder governing bodies or the Board of Trustees. In Italy for instance, the CdS (Consiglio degli studenti) is a consultative body participating in decision making as a compulsory advisor. Inasmuch as students are concerned, policy papers such as the one recently published by their international union ESIB[3] (ESIB, 2006; CE, 2003), underline that "students have to be involved in the entire process of decision-making in HE on equal terms with the other actors in the HEI", invoking efficiency as a good reason since "efficiency must not be interpreted in cutting down on democratic principles ... or the replacement of collegial decision-making structures with management bodies". Yet, such statements have remained without significant effect until now. Altogether internal democratization of universities, either in terms of representation or participation, is not obvious.

Does democratization actually take place, or is it simply a way to counter "isomorphic pressures, being more about presentation and legitimacy than a genuine willingness to transform decision-making process" (Newman, 2001)? The question is difficult to answer on the basis of available evidence. Some signs can be interpreted as symptoms of democratization in university governance as well in countries where reformist policy doctrines strictly relate to the NPM narrative as in countries where softer visions of university policies remains.

10.2 From Redefinitions of the Role of the Nation-State Back to Governance Narratives

Echoing Chapter 1, the first section has explored implications of the massive trend in Europe towards management in HEIs and the development of new steering tools by public authorities, on the place of national (or regional) states in charge as a specific actor among several emerging stakeholders. The final section goes back to the narratives the book starts with, to evaluate their ability to account for local trajectories and possible convergence between countries.

10.2.1 The Social Use of Narratives

Analyses of HE reform policies and their effects on HE systems come in different versions. How may the pattern and outcome of processes of reform and change during the last 25 years be understood best?

Policy makers and administrators responsibility for evaluating pressing problems in need of solutions tend to emphasize an actor's perspective. Scholars entertaining an actor's perspective often claim that policies are the product of the actions of major actors, like policy makers and affected groups, where policies are understood in terms of the preferences of the actors involved in the decision process (Ostrom, 1990; Scharpf, 1997; Tsebelis, 1999). According to these interpretations the degree and pace of change depend on the aims of the actors and

[3] Renamed ESU (European Student Unions) in 2007.

may be explained either by changing values and aims among actors or by changes in the constellation of actors involved. However, other scholars have depicted the reform processes as complex, hard to delimit and difficult to interpret in terms of specific actors, choices, outcomes and consequences (Bleiklie, 2004; Bleiklie et al., 2000; Kogan et al., 2006). Such observations have often been taken to support an *institutionalist perspective* according to which policy change tend to be path dependent and slow. Change become abrupt only if circumstances create a situation in which existing policies are considered inadequate to sustain institutionalized values, norms and practices in a given policy field (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; March and Olsen, 1989; Maassen and Olsen, 2007). A third perspective is based on the observation that structural change tends to be based on evolving needs generated by developing pressures on social systems. According to this *functional perspective*, change depends on external pressures and how social systems respond to them in order to remain stable (Ben-David, 1971; Parsons and Platt, 1973). The specific organizational forms of concrete universities depend on how society's need for cultural functions is expressed.

These perspectives inspire some of the major policy narratives that structure current policy discourses. Narratives are "stories or description of actual or fictional events".[4] Their strength is based on their internal coherence that affords cognitive frames used as policy models and theories for action (Dawkins, 1976). As explained in Chapter 1, two narratives presently dominate the stage as guides for action and understanding of public management changes. They are the ones that we explored throughout the analysis of national cases.

The NPM narrative is one of the most widely used narratives in social science analyses of public sector reform in the last decades. It represents a perspective that focuses on changing beliefs, whereby public agencies are induced to change their *modus operandi* from bureaucratic to entrepreneurial, and start operating as business enterprises in the market – *in casu* producers of educational and research services – rather than rule following bureaucratic entities (Bleiklie et al., 2000; Ferlie et al., 1996; Pollitt, 1993). The NPM perspective focuses on *changing beliefs about the instruments of governance* designed to increase the efficiency of service production. As it is applied here, the narrative assumes the following causal structure of policy driven change processes in public HE systems. Changing ideas about appropriateness of public steering, its purpose, its prominence and its instruments lead to redefinition of the policy problems with which governments are faced and the adoption of reforms that espouse new steering instruments reflecting the new ideas. Thus the NPM narrative bears a strong similarity to the normative or sociological institutionalist notion of policy change.

The NG narrative assumes a causal structure consistent with an actor's perspective. The NG perspective as formulated here refers to a situation where horizontally organized networks of actors formulate, administer and implement public policies rather than hierarchically organized public bureaucracies. This is assumed to

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[4] The American Heritage dictionary.

have organizational implications as policies are implemented in a more non-hierarchical, discursive and open-ended fashion (Jones et al., 1997). In this case policy change is the outcome of changing actor constellations that lead to redefinition of policy problems, bring with them new ideas about the content and process of policy reform and adopt reforms intended to address these new or redefined policy problems.

Yet, NPM and NG are not alike. As it was born in the UK, NPM was built as ex ante theory for action, translating public choice theories in a systematic model[5] to plan and drive a new public service design. NG on the contrary is rather an ex post model built by social scientists to make sense of the development of policy networks. Yet, it can also inspire bits and pieces of action at the policy level.

Claiming to provide a plausible account of public policies, NPM and NG narratives "tell policy and management stories", mixing "technical, political and normative elements".[6] Their strength is based on their internal coherence that affords cognitive frames used as policy models and theories for action (Dawkin, 1976). The ideas, frames and tools they are made of emanate from, and circulate among networks (such as the OECD) usually connecting policy makers and experts, aiming at organizing or correcting action.

10.2.2 *Narratives Versus Hard Facts?*

It is a constant temptation to label what has occurred by the name of narratives. Ex post, what has occurred may look for instance like the result of implementing an NPM policy, even though policy-makers made incremental changes, moving step by step without much vision on what the next moves could be, as was the case in France during the 1980s and 1990s (Bezes, 2005). It can also well be that, considered in context, some 'policies' were not real choices, they 'just happened' as unintended consequences of the addition of disjoint decisions. Only meticulous historical study can disentangle hard historical facts from ex post rationalization in cognitive frames built by narratives, and check if interpretations embedded in narratives fit in general theories without 'degenerating' ad hoc hypotheses. Actually, any event can logically be assigned to any ex post reconstruction. Let's take an example. NPM theorizes reduced 'unit contribution per student' by the state as a way to force universities to be evaluated "on the market" by increasing mutual competition towards "clients". It could also be asserted that NG emerged from the necessity for local actors to compensate for the loss of resources induced by the limitation of state basic funding per student, by finding new contributors to cover HE costs. But then again, these two theorizations could simply provide ex post rationales for what happened when policy makers in the post-World War II European countries were confronted simultaneously with rising student numbers

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[5] With several versions.
[6] See above, Chapter 1.

and the fear of political discontent relative to possible rising fees, as was clearly the case in France, Switzerland, Germany[7] and even UK. Counter-forces do exist in society that may block the implementation of policy instruments that policy makers could consider as desirable. In a further variation of the latter interpretation, it could also well be that public authorities did not consider increasing fees as desirable, because they strongly believed in the virtues of free access to HE. Finally, repeated policy decisions taken in moving political contexts and in varieties of cultures, create hybrids that derive from the fact that Ministries of Education, of Finance and parliamentarians have different perspectives, are fuelled by a variety of narratives, ideologies, views of interests and anticipations of reactions of constituents (Allison, 1969). While the narratives present ideal types of reforming, the empirical cases also suggest hybrids and locally influenced trajectories.

Thus narratives tell stories that should not be confused with history of policy building or implementation. Talk, decision and implementation are three different things in political organizations (Brunsson, 1989). Narratives prefer to develop systematic ex post theories of facts rather than to deal with their actual chronologies. Narratives are systematic while histories of public policies most of the time display contradictory and contingent behaviors, as a result of tensions between values in the political arena, in civil society and in different parts of the state apparatus. In real life, the capability of any single actor—including the "state" or the "government"—to impose its vision is limited. The value of narratives, or idealized visions, is with providing us with a cognitive framework that enables us to look at detailed histories through a different pair of eyes and to assess empirical evidence accordingly.

10.2.3 The Resistible Rise of New Public Management as a Benchmark?

Recent changes do show clear signs of universities moving from administrative institutions towards managed organizations, based on diversification of funding, development of management tools, and external steering by incentives and performance (Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Kogan et al., 2006). But change is not restricted to the rearrangement of vertical relations between central authorities and individual HEIs. They also reveal symptoms of the types of horizontal rearrangements described by the NG narrative, as we observed pervasive hybrid forms across a number of the cases. Finally the shift from ex ante direct regulation to indirect regulation by means of incentives, evaluation and accountability procedures in many cases demonstrate the versatility and strengths of the central government regulation capacity.

Yet, it has become all too commonplace to think of these changes in terms of the NPM narrative alone. Indeed, individual policy tools have been discussed and to a certain extent developed in all countries, which can be considered as belonging to

the NPM narrative repertoire. Such is for instance the case of the 1985 Dutch HOAK policy paper (Maassen, 1987). Yet, until the mid-1990s, they were not implemented in an NPM cognitive frame as was the case in the UK, i.e. as a weapon against collegial professional bureaucracies. Outside the UK and possibly the Netherlands, they did not have the ambition of building an exhaustive system of operational instruments springing up from a highly elaborated ex ante theory for action. The UK must be understood as a NPM outlier, out of which the diffusion of most radical NPM ideas proved problematic. The interest for new policy instruments in other places resulted mostly from the increasing cost-awareness of activities in HER in the first place. It pushed governments to create or appropriate new instruments in view of reducing costs by better decentralized management, more selectivity in funding and creation of new tools of distant control by the state. Changes appeared slowly, developed step by step, and were at first largely contained into national traditions of HE. Many supposedly new levers of action were simply digested by the environment they were supposed to impact. Implementation of change revealed incremental rather than radical trajectories. In opposition to the clean design of the NPM narrative, what public authorities did or did not implement over the last 30 years had to do with explicit or implicit pressure or resistance of actors, both from within and outside HEIs. Yet, the NPM design contributed to the diffusion of neo-liberalism, by progressively or suddenly changing the state's agendas and the power balance among social actors. Clearly, the deployment of new instruments was a second step in that direction, that took care of the vertical relationship between central authorities and individual public institutions. They increased at the end of the 1990s, and benchmarking accelerated with international circulation of public management models over the last decade. But by no means did implementation simply mean applying a systematic model of management that claimed to rebuild public service as an all-encompassing quasi-market within the NPM perspective, for at least two reasons. First, outside the UK and the Netherlands, governments did not possess the political resources required to develop an agenda of the sort and have it efficiently implemented in the very sensitive arena of HE. Second, in some countries like France,[8] public decision-makers and high civil servants often just could not even cognitively consider regulating the public sector through quasi-markets, and were not socially feeling like getting rid of forms of state authority in which their traditional power was rooted. It is only during the last decade that NPM as a narrative largely invaded the reflection on change in the public sector in much of continental Europe and even here reception was locally contingent.

At the same time, competing narratives such as NG have developed to make sense of the rise of horizontal rearrangements within HER systems, in relation with the emergence of new actors in new arenas, and their impact on the regulation of HER.[9]

[7] This is not any more the case, since UK extended fees in the early 2000s and Germany in 2006–2007 in almost all Länder.

[8] It was clearly not the case in others like the Netherlands for instance, where this point was extensively debated in the first half of the 1980s, between some 'visionary' civil servants and some (neo)liberal and social-democrat ministers.

[9] In this study, initiated before Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2004) ideas gained influence, we formulated network governance as an alternative to the NPM narrative.

Ewan Ferlie concludes the UK national chapter by stressing that British NPM certainly cannot be reduced to a policy fad, considering the strong impact of policy instruments created in the 1980s on size, management and internationalization of universities. He also mentions clear signs that the NPM doctrine has now reached dangerous limits in terms of its own operating costs and, even more damaging, in terms of its consequences on the ability of HEIs to accomplish their multiple and contextual missions. He explains the apparent rise of some elements of NG narrative in the UK by the need to counterbalance the excesses of NPM by restoring some freedom to HEIs. This is an analysis of the UK case, which as we have seen remains a NPM outlier. Would that mean that the reform of the post-World War II welfare-state should necessarily imply some ineluctable and generalizable historical policy sequence that can be applied generally, one first step conforming to the NPM narrative, followed by a second phase of necessary adjustments, such as NG?

The answer is no. The full set of cases suggests there is not a natural curve at the policy level, leading from 'old-Weberian' bureaucracy to NPM and 'back' to NG. The NG narrative may be a counter-effect of the NPM narrative and a reaction to NPM policies, as suggested in the British national case. But NG may also directly result from shortcomings in the practice of HER, while maintaining some basic axioms from the welfare-state policy regime. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) propose the same type of vision with their "Neo-Weberian model (NWM)" as a continental alternative to the NPM British model.

Neo-Weberianism focuses on the *functions* of governance and reform processes whereby new aspects of public activities are formalized and made accessible to outside administrative and political control (Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani, 2008). Whereas the two former narratives tend to assume that the changes mean that the state and public authority are weakened, the latter assumes a positive role of the state, a distinctive public service and a particular legal order. Changes, therefore, might testify to the adaptability and resilience of state structures faced with a changing environment and new challenges demanding new organizational arrangements. This line of reasoning is consistent with a functional perspective as it assumes the following causal sequence of policy driven events. Pressures from the environment of HE, e.g. greater demand, results in growth and differentiation that make it necessary for public authorities to implement structural change in order to stabilize the function of HE provision by controlling costs more efficiently and strengthening the efforts to steer the increasingly diverse sector more tightly.

The British intellectual climate, with its tradition of empiricism in philosophy and with a clear dominance of economic reasoning even when it comes to 'government delivering the goods', was certainly a better breeding ground for the NPM narrative than found on the continent (Neave, 1982). In continental Europe, the overarching metaphor (and organizational culture) was not economic, but rather legalistic and procedural: as different as they were from each other, the Humboldtian and Napoleonic HE systems shared the view of HER as part of public 'service' to its citizens. And this view has not been destroyed by the use of new management tools in HEIs.

It may be (and seems to be quite often the case in many of the countries studied) that NG developed as the result of evolutions of the classical bureaucratic state relaxing substantive constraints, for instance in order to compensate for its loss of financial resources, without requiring to first implement NPM as a theory of action.

As demonstrated in the national chapters, all countries present a mix of signs and symptoms of NPM and NG. Even the index case for NPM, the UK, shows relatively strong development with regard to NG indicators. And France, that has recently become an index case for NG, equally has developed a good number of implicit NPM characteristics over the years. Altogether, outside extreme cases such as the UK, and to a certain extent the Netherlands, effective HER policy reforms are moderately strong on both the NPM and NG dimensions. And it is difficult to tell whether which came first.

For many reasons, including probably the "aesthetics" of NPM intrinsic systemic design, rationales for reform tend nowadays to be absorbed by the NPM narrative. Yet, as we have shown, it is not a fair account of the overall historical development of new policy instruments. Indeed, our study uncovered international trends of more or less parallel movements in many countries, though two seem to be following a somewhat different route (the UK and the Netherlands). These movements or routes constitute trends that can be expressed as different mixes of the two dominating narratives of this day, NPM and NG. The differences derive mainly from the path dependencies of the movements in each country. Moreover, the narratives get twisted to some extent in the different intellectual and policy debates, probably due to variation in national political and administrative traditions, to the influence of individual authors and consultants but certainly also due to political coincidences, such as which party gets elected to power in a given country at a moment when a certain element of a certain narrative is *en vogue*.

A similar conclusion was reached by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). They spoke of multiple goals ('omegas' in their parlance), multiple trajectories and unforeseen developments. In our study, the goals and trajectories are distinguished in more detail as narratives and policy instruments – and the complex relationship between the two. But the result is the same. In their effort to establish to what extent public management had been reformed in the last decades of twentieth and the very first years of the twenty-first centuries, Pollitt and Bouckaert focused mainly, in our terms, on the replacement of the welfare-state policy regime with the NPM narrative. By inductively arrived at proposing an NWM as an alternative to, and not a correction of NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 99–100), they assessed that realities in the different countries did not quite conform to either the 'old' Weberian model nor to the new NPM one. They sorted out two variants of NWM, a Northern European one with more emphasis on the democracy elements, and a central European one that was more managerially oriented. This new model can be read as integrating properties subsumed under the labels of NPM and NG narratives. On the 'Weberian' side, it reaffirms the role of the state in providing public services, working under (modernized) administrative law, and legitimized by representative democracy. On the 'Neo' side, it includes a turn to results for external stakeholders (who in some countries tended to get more direct influence), supported by a new

quality culture in the re-professionalized[10] public service. We suggest to add the NG to this landscape, that enhances two aspects of this neo-Weberian transformation: on the 'Weberian' side, it stresses the increasing part played by participative democracy in terms of legitimization; on the 'Neo' side, it considers the new ways of setting public agendas in emerging public action arenas enabling horizontal arrangements between heterogeneous actors.

NPM and NG narrative emphasize change away from traditional policy instruments and the adoption of new more market like instruments in multiple and heterogeneous stakeholders environments. They insist on change, by stressing traits that may weaken traditional state steering and represents a move towards governance by networks that include state as well as non-state actors. On the contrary, the NWP narrative emphasizes continuity. Policy change is interpreted as an expression of the continued strength and versatility of the state. This is demonstrated by its ability to adjust to new kinds of pressures by adopting new policy instruments, yet retaining and strengthening its efforts at maintaining and extending its bureaucratic influence over an increasingly complex and costly HE sector.

10.3 Conclusion

It is striking that changes in HE follow the same routes during the same period of time, as trends in other public sectors such as health, social care, security, justice, etc. Also striking is the fact that the present situation displays, with various weight depending upon the country and the sector, all three possible types of regulation: by substantive rules, which was dominating the "old Weberian state", by markets or quasi-markets as described by in the NPM narrative, and by institutionalization of collective action, as in the NG model. As different as they may be, these regulations coexist in the HE sector as well as in most public sectors, and all require some form of involvement by the state: to write the rules, to warrant markets, to offer institutional and legal devices. Thus, the weight of each mode of regulation does not naturally bring about the hollowing out or the reinforcement of the state, but different forms of expression of public authorities, different ways of being a policy actor.

There is not one single story to narrate the same history of continuity and change of public sectors regulations. Yet, the preference for a specific story as a cognitive frame for thinking and organizing reform may have huge influence on action, because narratives are theories for action. Restricting the 'good government', to a uni-dimensional vision supplied by a given narrative, precisely when, more than ever, reality seems multidimensional, is probably a factor of risk rather than a solution to public management issues.

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[10] We prefer 're-professionalized' to Pollitt and Bouckaert's term 'professionalized', because the traditional bureaucrat was schooled in the legal *profession*, which now is not supplanted but complemented with other competences taken from the organizational or managerial professions.

Thematic Charts[1]

LAWS, DECREES... PROCEDURES

	1980s	2000s
France	National and public universities (Faure act, 1968), with detailed substantive and compulsory steering confirmed by Savary act, 1984. Public or private self organized Grandes écoles. More procedural steering of separate research organizations since 1945 (CNRS general, many others by issue), confirmed by Chevenement act, 1982.	No legal responsibility of Regions over public HERI in spite of decentralization acts (1982, 2002). No new acts on HERI before 2006, but new procedural instruments (e.g., contracts). Goulard act (2006) creates new procedural institutional (evaluation and accreditation agency), organizational (PRES, RTRA, pôles de compétitivité, instituts Carnot) and legal frames (FCS, EPCS), that are added to the old ones. LRU (Law "responsibility and liberty of universities", 2007) increases university presidential and executive board's authority on universities that are to become autonomous and accountable.
Germany	The Federal Ministry for Education and Research regulates core organizational structures, conditions of access to universities, degrees and categories of academic personnel and salary via Federal Framework Law (from 1976). Universities are public institutions under the jurisdiction of the German states (Bundesländer)	In the realm of an overall reform of legal responsibilities inside the German federal order, the Federal Framework Law on HE finally gets abandoned (in 2008). Beneath the financial responsibility the states receive the full legal responsibility for the HEIs. In 1998, the Federal Framework Law was hollowed out to give governance responsibilities (continued)

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[1] Coordinated by Catherine Paradeise, Emanuela Reale & Gaële Goastellec. Updated September 15, 2008.

C. Paradeise et al. (eds.) *University Governance,*

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	1980s	2000s
	with each state regulating its universities via a more detailed state law inside the framework of the federal law. Universities have own charters, regulating their specific internal governance under the law. Universities receive their recurrent institutional funding from the state ministries for cultural affairs and education. This is not sufficient the federal ministry helps with additional money programs in consent with the state ministries.	back to the states and to the universities themselves. The Federal Government is still involved in funding universities via new forms of temporary project programs ("Excellence Initiative", "Hochschulpakt"). After three states won a legal case against the Federal Ministry before the Constitutional Court study fees have been introduced in many states since 2005.
Italy	University reformed by laws (1980) creating new career paths for professors, dedicated research budget, organizational changes of departments as structures in charge of research, management, doctoral degree. Substantive rules (as recruitment and professors appointment) still defined by the State.	Creation of a Ministry of universities, research and technology (MURST later MIUR) (1989). More procedural laws and acts, with more degrees of freedom for universities and some increase in the national steering capability.
Netherlands	HE national policies mostly based on a 1960 act. Procedural laws and derived regulations. Substantive issues usually left to academic freedom. Substantive steering may occur (e.g., appointed ad hoc academic committees to agree on national plans for specific disciplines).	Substantive issues still left to the university management. Orientation towards institutional autonomy and ex post evaluation confirmed and strengthened by a policy paper (1985) and a new HE law in 1993.
Norway	Before 1989, universities and research governed nationally, colleges regionally. Research funding and responsibility for research institute sector is national and divided among different ministries.	HE act (1995) unifies colleges and universities at the national level and under the ministry of education, with a common council. No change in the formal status of universities but more freedom of internal organization and less direct regulation. Research funding and responsibility unchanged.
Switzerland	Public cantonal universities steered by laws of their corresponding home canton and different ministries at the Confederation's level (1st Law on Universities (LAU) in 1968). The inter-cantonal agreement is the third funding mechanism for the	Revision of most cantonal laws, providing a legal framework for global budget and contract with HERIs. Revision of the Universities act (1999) creates input formula based budgets and reforms the CUS (Conference of Swiss Universities): while this

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	1980s	2000s
	cantonal universities (1981). Its *raison d'être* lies in the necessity to integrate all cantons in the financing of universities: each canton pays a given amount of money per "own" student to the university canton the student registers.	conference was previously bringing together policy makers and academics, it becomes exclusively composed of policy makers. Its aim is to create the basis of a shared steering between cantons and Confederation through more coordination. Academics are then located in the CRUS (Conference of Swiss Universities' Rectors), being in charge of implementing CUS policies. Introduction of a Law for UAS (Universities of Applied Sciences) in 1995. The inter-cantonal agreement was revisited (late 1990s) in order to differentiate the allocation per type of disciplines and thereby to better adjust the allocations to the actual costs.
	Federal Institutes of Technology (FIT) are national and steered by the Confederation (since 1854). Since 1983, a Federal research law: no substantive, but only coordination and planning role for Confederation in the HER system.	Revision of the federal law on research creating performance-based contracts (2000). First law on FIT (1991) codifying the two FIT's as well as the national research centers' organisation.
UK	Steering through national and long established University Grants Committee, based on planning and financial incentives. HEIs are quasi autonomous institutions. Very occasional substantive primary legislation (e.g. 1988 education reform act turns Polytechnics into New Universities, 1992). Research is steered by series of Research Councils set up around disciplines (e.g., Medical Research Council).	Same basic pattern in England but national Funding Councils set up in Scotland in Wales, given devolution in the late 1990s. New Universities set up as independent Corporations, 1992. A new subagency (OFFA) established by the HE Act in 2004, to ensure fair admission policies with introduction of top up fees and policy concern about access.

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE

	1980s	2000s
France	National, under M. of education and research. All allocation and organization decisions on universities are taken with the help of advisory boards at the ministry level. More self-organization and strong identity in Grandes écoles and research organizations.	HER institutions come closer by creating joint research centers mainly located in HEI (1990–2000). CPU (Conference of University presidents) has become a collective actor for lobbying and promoting best practices.

(continued)

	1980s	2000s
(continued)		New procedural tools and agencies, either specific to HERI (ANR, 2005, AERES, 2006) and public management (LOLF, 2006) self-organization of HERIs at the local level (Research Pact 2006, LRU 2007) national steering by ex ante contracts, transfer of micromanagement tools to universities and ex post evaluation. Increasing role of public research organizations (CNRS in particular) as funding agencies (mostly funding of human resources).
Germany	National and federal. Federal Framework Law regulates core issues, the states regulate via state law and institutional funding. Intermediary bodies like the "Wissenschaftsrat" (WR) give policy advice for structural innovations. According to financial pressures agencies which provide third party funding – like the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" (DFG) – are getting more important. The HE sector is strictly separated from the strong extra-university sector (MPG, FhG, blue list institutes (today: WGL), national research centres (today: HGF).	Since a reform of the Federal Framework Law and the enforcement of the Bologna process by the Federal Ministry in 1998 new bodies for external governance have been established in and for universities. Internal: Boards of Trustees were established via state law in many universities, involving external stakeholders from industry, society and politics. One state – Lower Saxony – established regular and standardized evaluations of teaching and research. Others proceed with more or less incremental evaluations. Autonomous accreditation agencies replace state accreditation for B.A. and M.A.-study programs. A national accreditation council has been established to control standards. The "excellence initiative" brings universities and extra-university research institutions with their different governance regimes closer together (in "Clusters of Excellence"). In some cases institutions get merged (like KIT in Karlsruhe, which is a merger of parts of the Technical University with parts of the local Helmholtz-Research-Centre). A national Academy of Sciences has been introduced in 2008.

	1980s	2000s
(continued)		
Italy	National, under M. of public instruction. National advisory board of elected academics (CUN). Weak national government authority, none or very limited role of regional and local bodies, heavy fragmentation of the academic system. CNR acts as national advisory body for research activities through its 15 disciplinary-based National Advisory Committees.	New steering tools by the MIUR to be fully designed (financial incentives, accreditation, evaluation and control). New evaluation bodies created at ministry (National Committee for the evaluation of Universities – CNVSU and National Committee for the evaluation of research - CIVR) and at university levels (NUV = nucleus for internal evaluation). In 2007 the Agency for the evaluation of University and research (ANVUR) was created. Universities gain some managerial autonomy. CNR loses its role of advisory body.
Netherlands	National, by the M. of education and science. Programs controlled by the Academic Council. Non-university professional training under the secondary education legal regime. National research institutes, mostly administered apart from the university policy, by the Royal Academy of Science (KNAW). No role of regional and local authorities.	M. of education still dominant (ministry of economic affairs becomes a minor actor). Increasing steering by institutional autonomy and ex post evaluation (e.g., control by the Academic Council replaced by NVAO, an accreditation agency, 2002, research evaluation of universities operated jointly by VSNU, NWO and KNAW). New associations of the universities (VSNU) and colleges (HBO-Raad), with a role of self-regulation, lobbying and (until 2002) external quality assessment. Increasing role of Boards of Trustees and advisory committees as ways to align institutional strategies with external stakeholders.
Norway	National, mainly by M. of education and/or research, but public governance of the colleges regional. Coordination and promotion of national level initiatives by the U. rectors' conference (Council of Norwegian Universities, 1989) 5 specialized research councils.	M. of education controls entire HE sector (1995). Councils for colleges and universities merge (1997). Merger of research councils (1995). Creation of an agency for accreditation and quality assurance – NOKUT (2003).

(continued)

	1980s	2000s
Switzerland	Cantonal universities are ruled by Cantonal and federal authorities and administration: Federal Department of Home Affairs and CUS (Swiss University Conference), which is the Confederation-cantons body, enforcing decisions relative to programmes, diploma recognition, etc. The Federal Institutes of Technology (FIT) are ruled by the Federal Council through the Federal Institutes of Technology board. FITs.	Cantons remain the principal authorities for universities, but increased activity of the Confederation as an external governance actor, through the Accreditation and Quality Assurance of the Swiss Universities (OAQ) intervening indirectly in the HERI governance process. No real changes on FIT. Creation of networks of Universities of Applied Science (UAS, former tertiary institutions upgraded to university status) which are placed under the Federal Department of Economic Affairs and the corresponding cantons. The SNF (Swiss National Science Foundation) contributes more to Universities and FIT, using new instruments.
UK	National by M. of education. University grant council (UGC) is the main agency acting as buffer institution between universities and government. Limited role of local government at the level of Polytechnics. Sub-agencies set by UGC (for instance for QA). Micro autonomy of universities Research councils steer research through the allocation of public funding and evaluation of project outputs.	Same basic pattern in England, but devolution of HE policy in Scotland and Wales. Polytechnics become universities and their boards lose their regional representation. New role of the Department of Trade and Industry as a major actor in promoting policies enhancing university third mission. Research councils increasingly steer doctoral training. Reinforcement of research councils control, through the creation of Research Councils UK (RCUK) in 2002, a joint venture between research councils and the Office of Science and Technology (OST).

STAKEHOLDERS

	1980s	2000s
France	Few formalized relations of universities with industry (no contracts, patents or licenses). Research contracts mostly with ministries.	Academics, students, firm representatives gain formal access to university governance bodies (Savary act, 1984), but remain weak actors at the level of universities.

(continued)

	1980s	2000s
	Civil society impact through students' voice at the societal level but are not influential at the university level. No role of inexistent or weak local governments.	Their role in the newly created executive University Boards (LRU, 2007) is reaffirmed. Regional and local governments get involved in HERIs as local assets (CPER, regional or local programs). Marginal % of funding, but increased impact of the local economic sector (third mission, vocational programme targeting local labour market, applied research for local firms, research contracts with public sector at regional, national, European levels and with large firms increase).
Germany	No remarkable influence of external stakeholders apart from state ministries and intermediary bodies (WR). Students and non-academic personnel were represented in the self-governance-structures of universities ("Gruppenuniversität").	Boards of Trustees were established via state law in many universities since 1998, involving external stakeholders. The external funding of research projects takes a drift toward thematically focused, big and collaborative programs. The Federal ministry enforces the need of industry collaborations in its funding programs. The "excellence initiative" involves stakeholders from university, extra-university research institutes and industry in "clusters". Students have in one case a say in the spending of the money from their study fees.
Italy	No national or local representation of students influencing teaching supply or university policies. Universities generally separate from the economic world.	CUN enlarged to students and technical and administrative staff, asked to make propositions on university planning and new criteria of resource allocation (1997). Local representatives may be involved in university government bodies. Industrial associations may advise government on HE policies. Firms and NGO gain in some universities a prominent role in funding and thus decision making.

(continued)

	1980s	2000s
Netherlands	Students, considered as members of the academic community, and staff have a strong position in democratic councils in universities and faculties that are strong in university governance. Few lay members in the U. councils. No national level input.	Loss of power by the democratic councils and dissolution of the departments weaken students' and staff's positions. They retain some power by being represented in study program councils. Education specialists in employers' associations take stances on HE issues. Boards of Trustees made up of external members connected to business and various levels of political authorities. Local and regional governments remain unimportant legally but more attention is paid to the regional role of HE. NWO (ex-ZWO), the most important funding organization in fundamental research, gets a larger share of research funding and increasingly focuses on strategic research.
Norway	No explicit stakeholders. Students are members of the academic community. Relations with industry in science and medicine, invisible because they do not provide contracts, patents or licenses.	Universities perceived as stakeholder organizations; explicit attempts at making relationship to industry, local authorities and students. "External representatives" on boards of institutions from 1995.
Switzerland	The integration of students in internal governance varies among universities. In general, external stakeholders do not take part in internal governance but sometimes personalities of science, economics, policy and the arts are represented in university bodies or may have some influence on internal governance. Stakeholders can intervene during the pre-parliamentarian procedures or use initiative and referendum.	No real change. According to the institution, students are more directly involved into internal governance.
UK	Stakeholders' role is not prominent. Student national representatives are active but do not actually impact university governance or decision making. Universities are mostly far from society. More linkage of	Slightly increasing role of some stakeholders. Students feedback impacts both the quality insurance system and the university ranking. Government stresses the importance of university third mission,

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	1980s	2000s
	Polytechnics with economic actors, moreover at the local level. Weakly developed democratic culture.	generating research collaboration with firms, technology arrangements and commercialization of results, with different race and pace in different universities. Regional level of government increases. Erosion of local authority and trade union representation on Boards of the new universities.

DECISION MAKING ON INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

	1980s	2000s
Germany	The state controls establishment and closure of faculties.	Due to financial pressures and target agreements between states and universities the latter try to establish certain profiles. Regional overcapacities in the supply of disciplines are getting reduced, single entities become merged. In the case of the University Duisburg-Essen two universities are merged into one. The new higher education-law in Northrhine-Westphalia (from 2007) allows the universities under this jurisdiction autonomous decision-making on internal organization. However, target agreements still exist.
France	The law allows reorganization of faculties and status, but with the very difficult condition of a 2/3 positive vote in the university body. The ministry has to agree.	LRU (2007) increases organizational autonomy to universities.
Italy	Universities can reorganize faculties. The ministry must approve.	Universities are free to reorganize research and training by modifying teaching supply with the minimum requirement procedure. Universities can also design their internal organization by modifying statutes and regulations. Value and type of funding for research and diversity. Co-financing for strategic research and promotion of inter-universities cooperation, European cooperation.
Netherlands		State controlled, e.g., the state controls establishment and closure of faculties. Within the boundaries of a nationally imposed frame, HEIs decide about their internal organization.

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	1980s	2000s
Norway	Reorganization may be decided by institutions. Ministry approves.	2005 act gives institutions the right to decide on their internal organization.
Switzerland	Reorganization may be decided by institutions.	Change occurs on who has the power to reorganize the HERI (see external organization, both are related). Some institutions can decide to reorganize themselves, but in general no major changes.
UK	Proposal for internal reorganizations are developed within each university. They may be politically controversial and in that case, other stakeholders get involved and may slower or stop the process. Some HEI reorganization driven by financial cutbacks (e.g., Aston).	Few market entries. No increase of the number of private universities. Emergence of regional collaborative alliances and consortia. New powers to award degrees to a wider range of independent providers in 2006 which erodes HEI monopoly. Some development of the strategic management core in HEIs and its internal capacity to steer a HEI.

PROPERTY OF REAL ESTATE, EQUIPMENT, CAPITAL

	1980s	2000s
France	Universities buildings and land belong to the state. No capital. Equipment funded by operational budgets. When they manage contracts, universities may perceive overheads as a percentage of the total amount of contracts.	LRU (2007) transfers property of real estate to voluntary universities. Increasing part of contract-based equipment funding. Some capital in new foundations. Emergence of full cost accounting and overheads.
Germany	University buildings and land belong to the states. No capital. Equipment is funded by institutional budgets and provided by the states.	In most states no change. In Lower Saxony universities can choose to organize themselves as foundations with ownership of real estate and own capital.
Italy	Universities own buildings and land or sign rent contracts. No capital. Equipment is funded by operational or research budgets. Contracts cover temporary needs for teaching and research.	Universities own buildings and land or sign rent contracts. Possibility for universities to act as members of consortia and societies and possess capital. A rising number of contracts covering temporary needs for teaching and research.
Netherlands	Real estate of public HEIs belong to the state. The church related private HEIs possess their own real estate.	All real estate has been devolved to HEIs. Universities can (and do) possess capital.

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	1980s	2000s
	No capital. Equipment is funded from national funds with help of the Ministry when necessary.	Equipment is funded from lump sum or from project funds.
Norway	University-administered real estate belongs to the state. They are not allowed to accumulate capital, but may establish foundations and companies. Equipment is funded by operating or research budget, with very limited contribution from industry sponsorship.	Unchanged. The proposition to put all HEIs buildings under one common national administration was turned down in 2006. Universities are not allowed to accumulate capital, but may still establish foundations and companies. No change in equipment funding.
Switzerland	University-administered real estate belongs to the state (cantons). Universities are not the owners but may use them commercially. They are not allowed to accumulate capital. Equipment is funded by operational or research budgets.	Capitalization of public budgets is authorized in narrow limits. Internal agency in Federal Institute of Technology board for funding projects' equipments. Some universities are given more power in the management of their properties (buildings, lands).
UK	Real estate owned by the universities, in the standard public sector manner. Equipment is provided on university operational budgetary cycle, or by research grant applications. Overheads are added to research grant bids but not calculated on a full cost basis.	No major change, but some more private property. Equipment unchanged. Some increasing investment by private capital in HEIs, including ownership of assets and land. Emergence of technology spin offs and patents. Much more explicit and elaborate full economic costing for research getting more overhead money in research.

EXTERNAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

	1980s	2000s
France	The national state pays salaries of university staff (that are civil servants). It is almost the only provider, through line item operating budgeting and a student enrolment based formula (GARACES). No competition between universities for resources: principle of equality of public service. Fees, contributions of firms, regions and Europe are very low. Research funding of universities is partly based on the basic grant of the universities. The rest is based on competitive public grants or	The share of public money per university student is among the lowest in Western Europe, while it remains good in GE. Competition for students remains low in spite of the demographic decrease of student numbers, and fees remain very low. The national state remains the major budget provider. Budgets become mission-oriented and global with the LOLF (2006) and LRU (2007). The rising integration of contractual negotiation between universities, Ministry and national research organizations favours the

(continued)	1980s	2000s
	private funds, often managed outside universities. Budgets increase in absolute numbers, but decrease per capita. In GEs, budgets per student remain quite good (they avoid massification). Public funding of strategic research outside universities in relation to major initiatives ("grands programmes").	development of university policies. In addition, universities are allowed to collect 15% of all research contracts for internal reallocation of resource. Starting 1983, an increasing proportion of university funding, is contract-based research funding, is contract-based (3% in 1985, 20% outside salaries in 2005 and directly allocated by the M. of research (and whenever joint ventures, by research organizations) to labs without the university having its say. The creation of the national evaluation agency (AERES, 2006) should increase the impact of performance on budgets. The share of competitive grants (regional, European, private), mostly for research increases at various race and pace across universities. The creation of a national research council (ANR) in 2005 increases the tendency towards "hidden differentiation". The so-called "campus campaign" (Spring 2008) aims at increasing diversification by allocation 3.5 billion euros to 10 universities on a competitive basis.
Germany	The states pay the salaries of university personnel. Nearly all professors, some senior lecturers ("akademische Räte") and many administrators are civil servants with tenure positions. Other academic staff is mostly employed on temporary contracts. The states provide institutional funding through line item operating budgeting and a student enrolment based formula ("Kapazitätsverordnung"). There is no competition between universities for resources: principle of equality of public service. No study fees; contributions of firms, regions and Europe are very low. Research funding of universities is partly based on the basic institutional grant of the universities.	The states remain the main budget providers. As the financial capacities of the states are limited the Federal ministry helps with additional money distributed via temporary project programs in consent with the state ministries. One of these programs is the "excellence initiative". Based on a nationwide competition on the best concepts for graduate schools, research clusters and future development this initiative distributes a total sum of 1.9 billion euros to those universities, who were successful in the competition. 9 universities, who were successful with their future development concepts (which also required success in one of the other two categories) are now the publicly so called "excellence- or elite universities" in Germany. Parts of the university budgets are distributed in most states according to performance formula, in most parts involving enrolment, teaching and graduation indicators and sometimes research indicators (in most cases the amount of third party funding). Each of the 16 states uses a different formula and distributes differing percentages of the operational budget according to performance indicators. Some states changed from line item budgeting to lump sum budgeting. Third party funding gets more and more important for conducting research. Since 2007 the Federal ministry and the states have started to establish the funding of overhead-costs for research projects approved by the DFG. Some states started to introduce modest study fees. External income from royalties and patents remains low.
Italy	The national state is the major provider. Line item budgeting. Low fees, no competition for students. No competition between universities. Teaching input based funding. Research funding is part of the basic grant of the universities. No incentives. Ex ante and top-down budget control. Little research regional and industrial funding, except in specific autonomous regions (ex. Trentino). Public funding constantly grows during the 80s.	The national state remains the main provider. Creation of a lump sum budget (2000) (FFO). A little share of FFO (about 0.5%) is allocated according to a formula based on production costs per student and production performance of students and graduates. 30% of the formula is dedicated to research. The share of students fees is increasing (should not exceed 20% of FFO). Rising competition between universities for funding. Increasing share of private funding (8% in 2002) and European grants, marginal but increasing role of regions in rich regions in professional training and technology transfer of local interest. No changes on budget control.
Netherlands	Public universities (as well as the 3 'private' ones) mainly funded by the state through a student enrolment based formula (varying across disciplines), with rising	HEIs receive lump sum budgets, based on a formula putting main emphasis on teaching output but also on input, still decreasing on a per unit basis.

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	1980s	2000s
	public money lagging behind student growth. Line-item budgeting, hierarchical bureaucratic, top-down relation. Private financing of teaching is almost absent. No competition for students. Some competition for infrastructure money. Symbolic fees around 1970 provoke heavy student protest. Research funding is part of the basic grant of the universities. Some private, no regional, very little European funding of research. Funding of strategic research with regard to major research initiatives (KNAW institutes for instance). Some research projects can be funded through the national research council (ZWO).	Infrastructures are part of the lump sum budget and may be improved by specific initiatives and funds (e.g., ICT). Teaching and basic research ministry grants are based on (teaching) performance (i.e., lump sum). Some regional funding in colleges, not in universities. Rising share of private funding and tuition (6% of universities, 18% of college budgets). Competition for good students and foreign students (higher fees), because of their impact on funding and the shrinking of recruitment. Increasing research funding becomes very competitive without concentrating in specific universities. Funds come from the national research council (NWO), Europe, contracts with private and public partners (20% of budget), grants from the ministry of economic affairs for national HRM in R&D.
Norway	2 parts in budgets (1) number of academic staff which each institution is allowed to fill, proposed by institutions budgets and approved by the ministry; (2) operating line item budget + ear-marked grants for new construction projects. Students funding with differentiation based on history and disciplines. Budget increase pulled by the college sector (by counties) and university sector stagnation, compensated by new vocational programs. Some lobbying of universities for infrastructures. National research funding, partly allocated by the ministries according to the "sector princi- ple", partly by 5 research councils on a competitive basis. Growth in research funding in sciences, medicine and social sciences. Few European funding.	No major change in the percentage of public funding. Budgets are global, and still into 2 parts: personal costs and operating costs. Addition of student and research output incentives to budgets (1990) (40% of total allocation nowadays). Rising competition for students with the introduction of performance based incentives. Rising competition on external research funding, from research councils, ministry, increasingly EU-funds (with a good rate of return), handled by universities or their entities. Insignificant regional funding, increase of European funding especially in research universities. Gradual shift of budget control from ex ante to ex post.

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	1980s	2000s
Switzerland	Universities resource allocation mostly from cantons, but also from Confederation (LAU). Based on historical and input criteria (student, staff, etc.). Beside these two resources, the inter-cantonal agreement is the third funding mechanism for the cantonal universities (1981). Really low tuition fees covering a small part of the administrative cost of student. Federal Institute of Technology resource allocation only from Confederation, also based on input and historical budget. Competitive research activities, funded by two agencies, one for basic research (SNF), the other for applied and industrial research (CERS). Little European research funding.	Universities resource allocation still mostly from cantons, but with the revision of LAU and cantonal laws (and the introduction of contract) they are more based on output criteria related to activity (70% teaching, 30% research activities). Since 1991, performance mandate between the CEPF and EPF introduced by law: 70% based on research, patent and education output and 30% on input criteria. Increased private funding of research (between 7% and 24% of the total budget in 2004; 45% in St Gallen). Considerable increase of competition for research grants from European programmes (15% of the total research activity). Funding agencies are reorganized.
UK	Overwhelmingly funded by the state, few regional contributions. UGC funds universities based on an input formula basis. Relatively small scale additional stream of income from premium fee and overseas students (in addition to public money). Public funding per student falls and development of a policy of "efficient expansion" squeezing university finances. No performance based funding for teaching. Incentives to comply with particular policy streams in student recruitment, for example (approved student numbers). Strong competition for structural funds. Research councils play an important role for research funding. Some industrial funding in engineering, few European funds.	Public funding still critical, with UGC remaining the main body in charge of funding. UGC reinforces its steer- ing role due to a strong application of the value for money principle with the (RAE) from 1986 onwards. Still a steering mode based on financial incentives. But a definitive long term shift to a more diversified funding base for teaching (industrial sponsor- ship on applied subjects, influence of regions on UGC schemes). Design of teaching funding changed as top up fees introduced in 2006 to rectify decades of under-funding of teaching. Students get loans instead of grants. Increase of the deregu- lated sector of education (ex: MBA, overseas students) where much higher fees are charged. Intense competition for this type of students. Strong competition for structural funds, eased by the private finance initiative (for students residences) and RDA. Research funding improves in relation with technology transfer objectives with rough competition. Limited European funds.

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	1980s	2000s
France	Universities are free to allocate budgets among, but most of them replicate the GARACES formula internally. Part of research resources remain hidden in the hands of research centers or individual academics.	Internal rules of allocation emerge in relation with the discussion on contracts. It should develop in many universities thanks to LRU (2007). More flexible management of research grants and patents in newly created university SAIC (2000) and new foundations escaping public accounting rules in PRES and RTRA (Research act, 2006). Both favour the internalization of research funds by reducing the pressure of public accounting rules.
Germany	The internal allocation of budgets is dependent on the line item budget plan of the state parliament and on the appointment contracts of the universities with their professors (with regard to associate staff, equipment and other issues of recurrent funding for chairs/professorships).	The turn from line item to lump sum budgeting gives most university administrations more leeway for an autonomous internal allocation of funds. Many faculties implement or discuss performance indicator based allocation systems. However, these developments are not coherent, not even in the same university.
Italy	Funds are equally distributed, following national rules.	Internal allocation of research funds is partially transferred to departments and sometimes rests at least partly on comparative internal quality evaluation. For doctoral training, allocation is usually equalized between professors within the departments.
Netherlands	Funds are equally distributed, following national rules.	HEIs decide about their own internal allocation. Quality assessment reports give managers legitimate information to diverge from the national formula, together with institutional strategy formulation when they come to allocate resources internally.
Norway	Allocation of personnel costs according to fixed rules defined by distribution of positions. No other rule of internal allocation which is determined historically. External research funding (public or private) often managed directly by researchers and therefore not visible on university budgets.	Considerable freedom of allocation by institutions: global funds and income from overhead charges give institutions more leeway in allocating resources internally in relation with their own priorities. Allocation in practice influenced by historically established practice.
Switzerland	Usually no internal funding instruments.	Most institutions tend to (increase or) introduce internal allocation mechanisms supplied within

	1980s	2000s
		faculties and departments budgets as strategic monies reserved for specific, institution-oriented projects.
UK	Each university is free to use its funding as it wishes through its internal allocation process. Students get grants through their local education authorities.	Some more ring-fencing of Funding Council allocations (RAE allocations to departments as well as HEIs; access funding). Student financing – grants give way to loans and top up fees.

ACCOUNTING, AUDIT

	1980s	2000s
France	A priori control, according to the rules of public accounting, under the control of the Cour des comptes. No analytic accounting, no provisions for depreciating, no ex post evaluation. Each training program leading to national degrees is accredited for 4 years by the ministry. Accreditation of programs is the key to operating budgets. Research budgets (including in mixed labs with CNRS) often have no visible relationship with evaluation. Their effect on total budgets is very limited.	Development of global budgeting, cost accounting, performance evaluation and ex post assessment (LOLF, 2006, Research Pact, 2006, LRU, 2007).
Germany	A priori control, according to the rules of public accounting, under the control of the Bundesrechnungshof (BRH).	Development of global budgeting and cost accounting in many states. Universities produce strategic plans, activity plans and annual reports to show if they reached the target agreements they contracted with the states. However, there is no standardized control of contract fulfillment.
Italy	A priori control, according to the rules of public accounting, under the control of the Corte dei Conti.	Managerial autonomy of universities. Development of ex post accounting control.
Netherlands	Public HEIs are part of the state apparatus and fall under standard bureaucratic agency accounting rules.	HEIs follow general accounting rules for not-for-profit organizations. External auditing takes place annually, also with an eye on European funds. Financial accounting to state has been simplified (marginal check and annual reports).
Norway	A priori control, according to the rules of public accounting, under the control of the Riksrevisjonen (Auditor General).	Situation is changed into ex post reporting. Institutions produce strategic plans, activity plans and annual reports.

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	1980s	2000s
Switzerland	Itemized funding, taking history into account. No ex post evaluation.	Development of cost accounting with the introduction of global budget and output criteria based on contract. Recently introduction of internal audits by political authorities.
UK	Traditional internal and external audit systems (HEFCE), in the usual public sector manner. So ex post checks for probity and value for money and well developed evaluation of departments and procurement processes. Each HEI also has its internal audit section and external auditors which sign off annual accounts. HEFCE monitors for financial risk at institutional level.	Traditional systems remain and accelerated in the 1990s. In the 2000s, HEFCE is aware of the audit burden and tries to introduce a lighter touch regime based on risk management. Full Economic Costings introduced in research which gets more resources into the system.

EVALUATION

	1980s	2000s
France	When they also belong to the CNRS, research labs and full-time researchers are evaluated by disciplinary commission (CN). No evaluation of departments and teaching staffs. The CNE (1984), dedicated to the evaluation of universities as wholes. It has no influence on funding but on the building of university identities.	Development of indicators based evaluation of diplomas and university research centers as a basis for ministry research accreditation. Evaluation of research activities of teachers belonging to mix research centers (2006). Creation of the national Evaluation and Accreditation Agency (AERES, 2006), in charge of institutional evaluation, with the mission to harmonize evaluation of departments, research centers, teachers and researchers across all higher education and research institutions. HERIs remain in charge of the evaluation of their own individual academics. Timid development of evaluation of courses using indicators jointly built with teachers.
Germany	Establishment of degrees and professorships must be approved by the state ministries. No research or teaching evaluation, no performance indicators.	Parts of the university budgets are distributed in most states according to performance formulae which make evaluations necessary. In most parts quantitative indicators like enrolment, teaching and graduation rates and sometimes research indicators (in most cases the amount of third party funding) are conducted. The "excellence initiative" can be

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	1980s	2000s
		regarded as a nationwide competitive evaluation effort to figure out places for excellent research. Most universities have regulations for the evaluation of teaching but not for research. In Lower Saxony a standardized state wide evaluation procedure for all universities and disciplines regarding teaching and research is established and controlled by a regional commission. Accreditation agencies evaluate the prerequisites for the establishment of bachelor- and master-programs according to the Bologna rules in the accreditation process.
Italy	Ministerial accreditation of training programs that lead to national degree. No evaluation system of universities. Evaluation starts for research projects in the frame of the Progetti di ricerca di interesse nazionale project funding (40% funds).	Formally development of evaluation since 1994, by didactics questionnaires and accreditation procedures (requiring minimal numbers of students, professors, lecture halls, etc). No much control on data and no impact of evaluation. Creation of a peer evaluation process of research quality (2004), impacting the research share of universities in the FFO. A new Agency for the Evaluation created in 2007. Audit of the educational function by CUN and of university governance by CRUI.
Netherlands	No research or teaching evaluation, no performance indicators. Intention of basing reallocation by research evaluation (1982) does not work much.	Individual teaching evaluation for HRM since late 1980s. Accreditation by the newly created accreditation agency of degrees is a prerequisite for funding (2002). But no systematic use of performance indicators in evaluation and accreditation although number of graduates may play some role. In research, bibliometrics may be used in appropriate fields. Research evaluation (1993) for internal management that may impact internal allocation. Evaluation of doctoral schools by KNAW (1992), with some financial incentives at the beginning only.

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	1980s	2000s
Norway	Establishment of degrees must be approved by the Ministry.	Evaluation system established through a comprehensive planning and reporting regime based on documents produced by HEIs (see accounting, audit). Research publications are reported to a national database. Teaching programs are evaluated by externally appointed program sensors. National evaluations of disciplines are organized by the RCN. Development of an institution for evaluation and accreditation, focusing on quality of internal evaluation and accounting systems (NOKUT).
Switzerland	Some universities or department have introduced evaluation of teaching activities, with no constraining consequences.	No HEIs-wide teaching or research evaluation. Teaching evaluation is the responsibility of institutions. Accreditation of study programmes favored by the Bologna process makes institutional evaluation more common, often on a voluntary basis. Institutional audits are required for Federal funding. Periodical evaluation for QA is becoming an objective of the institutions. Creation of the Accreditation and Quality Assurance of the Swiss Universities (AAQ) in research and teaching by the Confederation.
UK	Explicit and external evaluations start to increase in scale, impact, frequency. System wide evaluation of both training and research quality start developing, based on site visit and review of internal produced documents including key data and peer review of publications. Regular cycle of externally driven QA audits of each department. RAE occurs every 3 years from 1986 onwards. Teaching audits are published but do not link to teaching grants.	Increased selectivity linked to RAE results. Attempt to damp down transaction costs in both training and research audits, but they are still high. Reduction in frequency of RAE, change from peer review to a metric based approach in research is heralded after the 2007 RAE; attempt to shift to a "lighter touch" QA regime on teaching and a more developmental approach with Departments. New indicators reflect concern with fair access and widening participation

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HRM

Labour market regulations

	1980s	2000s
France	All HR are civil servants. Traditional public sector regulations. Full-time researchers become quasi-civil servants (1982).	LRU (2007) allows universities (with some limitations in terms of budget ratios) to recruit part of their teaching, research and administrative staff on long or short term contracts.
Germany	All professors are civil servants. Traditional public sector regulations for other academic staff but decrease in non-temporary (tenured) positions below the level of full professorships.	Newly appointed professors are regularly still public servants. The salary system of professors has been changed in 2004. In the new scheme the basic salaries for professors were decreased. Possibilities to upgrade the basic salaries via good performance have been established but are not used coherently (depending on the money a state or a university can spend). The majority of academic staff has temporary work contracts. The salary scheme of the public sector is still applied to academic staff.
Italy	All HR are civil servants. Traditional public sector regulations.	No changes for professors. Collective agreements for technical and administrative staff, as in the rest of the public sector.
Netherlands	Traditional public sector regulations (all civil servants).	Collective agreements, same for all HEIs, for academic staff, as well as for the technical and administrative staff. Universities are employers.
Norway	Traditional public sector regulations, collective agreements, centralised wage negotiations collective agreements with three different unions. Union of civil servants (organises all kind of university employees), Researchers' union (organises most academic staff) and a union of public administrative staff.	Changes in public sector regulation with more decentralised negotiation and local wage negotiations. Individual contracts for administrative and academic leadership positions.
Switzerland	Cantonal (universities) or federal (FIT) traditional public sector regulations for all staff: collective agreements ruled by the cantonal administrative employees' law.	Decrease of public sector regulations and collective agreement in favour of more individual and contractual relationships. The legal employees status still depend on the cantonal framework, but institutions may in some cases choose the level of salary scale at which they recruit and provide additional resources.

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	1980s	2000s
UK	Highly traditional public sector HRM systems across the sector. Faculty are employees of the University and not civil servants. Nationally agreed pay scales through collective bargaining. National pay bargaining involving trade unions and national salary scales. Very little local discretion and few individually negotiated contracts.	Basically the scheme of eighties persists. National pay bargaining still in place but a few universities have left national salary scales. A University demand for more regional and local elements in pay emerges. A little experimental diversification at local level: by introducing some changes in remuneration scheme by adopting more private sector style.

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE LABOUR FORCE

	1980s	2000s
France	Suppression of the temporary contracts of teaching assistants (1984). All teachers are tenured, except for doctoral students and for teaching "per hour".	Important rise of permanent teaching positions since 1981. Most teachers are tenured, except doctoral students with yearly contracts as teaching fellows (ATER and "moniteurs") specific medical staff (20% of the HE faculty members) and staff teaching "per hour" (no figures available) that increased with massification. 3-years labour contracts for an increasing part of doctoral students with M. of research or co-funded by M. of research and firms (CIFRE). Slow rise of post-docs funding since 2000. Short-term contracts on research grants (ANR, 2005).
Germany	Permanent status (civil servant) is standard for professors and some other tenured academic staff ("akademische Räte"). Most other academics on temporary contracts.	The "Junior-Professorship" has been introduced as new status category in 2002. A Junior-professor does not need a "Habilitation", has – in most cases - the same rights as a full professor but limited teaching duties and the lowest salary among professors. Junior-professorships can be tenured but are in most cases limited to 3 + 3 years (the latter time is given after a positive performance evaluation in the middle of the term).

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	1980s	2000s
		Graduated academics below professorial rank can hold regular university positions no longer than 12 years on temporary positions. Otherwise they must be promoted on a tenured position or financed via third party funds. No differentiation between "teaching" or research only" positions yet.
Italy	In the eighties, stabilisation of teachers who were recruited on temporary contracts, and setting up of a three levels professor career from researcher to full professor.	No variation (but ageing) of support staff and academics. Increasing number of temporary teaching contracts with diversification of teaching supply. New flexible temporary research positions, remaining in fact in the long term.
Netherlands	Permanent status (civil servant) is standard. New status is temporary such as "scientific assistant" for PhD candidates.	Permanent status much scarcer than in the 80s and has less protection (formally no longer civil servants). PhD trainees all on temporary contracts, as many post-doc.
Norway	Nearly all university sector academic positions are tenured professors and associate professors with 50/50 teaching and research obligations. In the College sector, nearly all the academic positions are tenured.	In addition to tenured staff, rising number of: - Temporary and permanent positions in research centres and externally funded projects. - Doctoral fellowships, temporary and permanent research positions in research centres and externally funded projects. - Some increase in temporary staff teaching positions.
Switzerland	Mainly tenured faculty (civil servant) but other status than professors and tenured middle-range academics (MER) may exist on short terms contracts.	Development of part time positions. Slow introduction of tenure track in some HEI. Promotion of women in academia and creation of tenure path for junior members as institutional and political objective.
UK	Mainly tenured faculty but with some shorter term research positions.	Rise of non-tenured staff for both teaching and research activities. Growth of short-term-contracts for flexibility. Rise of women in faculty especially at the junior level and ageing of faculty in some subjects.

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DECISION FOR RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION

	1980s	2000s
France	Academic positions formally created, signed and managed by the minis-try. Hiring by disciplinary elected local committees under the final control of a central mostly elected academic disciplinary national body (CNU). Administrative and technical staff are recruited at the national level by civil servants exams.	Remains the same until 2007, but the CNU has less power because the local committees have the final say. Academic positions to be recruited are recommended to the Ministry by the presidential team and university bodies. More and more university presidents are allowed to freely allo-cate a small percentage of positions. Periodic projects intend to enlarge the autonomy of university manage-ment on human resource. Major change with LRU in 2007. Local ad hoc recruitment com-mittees replace nationally ruled "Commissions de spécialistes". Choices of positions to be offered, employment status and recruitment are in the hands of the president and executive board.
Germany	Universities faculties have the right of self-recruitment but need the approval of the state ministry for the professorial candidate they want to appoint. The faculties set up com-missions for recruiting new profes-sors. Once employed a professor can only bargain for an upgrade (of his rank or his staff/equipment) when he gets a call from another university. A doctoral degree and a "Habilitation" (a second book + an additional graduation) have to be passed to become a potential candi-date for a professorship. The recruitment of in-house-candi-dates for professorships is in most cases forbidden. Academic staff below professorial rank is chosen by public competi-tion and hired by the individual professor for whom the candidate will work. However, the work contract is with the university as a public sector entity. A formal promotion or career path is not existent in the German university system.	In many cases the central university leadership together with the newly established boards of trustees have a say in recruiting new professors according to the universities profile in a certain discipline. The ability to win or to engage in large collaborative research grants of the EU or the DFG is deemed to be a strong indicator of excellence, and valued accordingly in the decisions of recruitment commissions. In some states approval of candidates by the ministry is no longer necessary. A successful evaluated Junior-professorship equals the habilitation. However, the habilitation is still in practice and in many cases obligatory. No changes for other academic staff, still no formal career path.

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	1980s	2000s
Italy	Competitions for positions at national level according to national rules. Faculty councils ask for positions/ promotions. Rectors send the request to the Ministry that decides. Political power of the professor fostering recruitment or promotion has a decisive influ-ence on Faculty choice.	Competitions for positions at university level according to national rules. Plans of university development include HR plans, to be approved by the Ministry. Annual number of new positions fixed by rectors in coop-eration with the university senate. Hiring and promotion decisions taken by rectors based on Faculty council propositions. Still central role of full professors and disciplines.
Netherlands	Number and levels of positions based on students numbers through a normative formula. Funded by government. Research and teaching staff appointed by universities. Full professors are formally appointed by the Crown. Promotions below professor by the university depending on available positions.	The university decides on budget avail-ability for new staff posts as well as for promotions. This authority can be devolved to the Faculty Dean.
Norway	Recruitment and promotion depend on the availability of new posi-tions allocated annually to each institution, but usually dedicated to a specific discipline and depart-ment. Disciplinary committees make recommendations based on review of academic qualification. Formal decisions on full professor positions are made by the minis-try, on associate professor posi-tions by university board.	Recruitment depends on the availability of funds at faculty level which then are allocated internally according to some kind of needs based formulas. Recommendations by disciplinary com-mittees. On full professor positions, formal decisions by the institution board, on associate professor and other positions by the faculty board. Increasing proportion of full professors after qualifications instead of fixed number of positions determined pro-motion from 1990.
Switzerland	Full professors recruited by the cantonal or Federal government (Universities or FIT) based on academic commission proposition; assistant professors by the aca-demic department commission;	No general change, but some universi-ties get more autonomy, such as the university of Lausanne that now appoints all members of its staff. Due to transparency requirements the publication of the available

	1980s	2000s
	assistants by the professors. Promotion rules vary across universities and cantons. Internal promotion is not the rule.	academic positions for assistants and middle range professors is compulsory. Internal promotion is not the rule but can be codified by the university to be used in some cases.
UK	Faculty positions created by each University, based on strategic choices on subjects to be developed. Recruitment decisions by senior panel members inside the university, advised by senior external academics acting as peer reviewers. Promotion: internal panels of academics advised by academic externals for senior posts.	No change except that RAE creates a sellers' market for research stars.

RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION: INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS

	1980s	2000s
France	Labour market largely internal and national, but no regulation prohibiting the recruitment of local candidates. Promotion and good career may require mobility. Deans are academics. Internal national labour market for administrative middle and top staff.	Idem. Individual and institutional performance assessment might increase mobility as a resource for both individual academics and universities.
Germany	Labour market is largely internal and national. Strong regulation prohibiting the recruitment of local candidates. Promotion and good career require mobility. Deans and members of the rectorate are academics. Internal national labour market for administrative middle and top staff.	In many cases presidents and rectors can now be appointed from outside the university and must not necessarily have the status as a full professor (although most of them still are members of the academic profession). Efforts are taken to open the national labour market for academic positions to international candidates. The recruitment of local candidates for professorships remains unusual.
Italy	Internal national labour market. Professors begin the academic career generally in small university then moving in larger ones. Internal labour market for the managerial career.	Internal national. Actual privilege to local candidates. New rules for recruiting high level scientists and foreign high level professors, with a ceiling to make propositions submitted to the approval of CUN.

	1980s	2000s
Netherlands	Internal labour market. Little staff mobility across universities. No university management career; Deans and rectors are internally elected academics.	Staff mobility across HEIs stimulated by short-term contracts. Increased number of part-time teaching contracts in the college sector. HEI management gradually becoming a career; former deans/rectors may become governing board members/presidents at other HEIs. Most deans are professors, though no longer always from the same faculty or HEI.
Norway	The academic labour market is internal and characterized by a low level of mobility. Small administration made up of secretaries and support staff.	The academic labour market remains the same in spite of many policy declarations in favour of increasing mobility. Transformation of administration from secretariat support staff to university educated staff in all functional departments.
Switzerland	Mainly internal but, depending on the situation of the HEI on the national market, recruitment can be partly external.	External labour market gains in importance depending upon the prestige of university, and to a larger extend for "ordinary professors" compared to other categories. Generally, faculties or departments local recruitment remains the norm.
UK	Labour market is mainly internal and national. Long established careers inside the sector and not much cross sectoral movement.	Some opening up of the labour market at the most senior level to key personnel from other sectors, countries or with experience of other countries, especially the USA (e.g., new VC at Cambridge).

PROMOTIONS: PERFORMANCE, STATUS AND SENIORITY, REWARDS TO "PUBLIC SERVICE"

	1980s	2000s
France	Important role of seniority even in supposedly merit-based procedure. Union affiliation can also play a role. Salary is fixed according to the same bureaucratic scale in all universities and disciplines.	Merit-based promotion + networking. Some specific rewards for administrative loads, extra teaching and doctoral tutorship.
Germany	Status and seniority play a stronger role than performance. Salary is fixed according to national	The salary system of professors has been changed in 2004. In the new scheme the basic salaries for professors

(continued)	1980s	2000s
	regulation and it is the same for all universities and disciplines.	were decreased. Possibilities to upgrade the basic salaries via good performance have been established but are used incoherently (depending on the money a state or a university can spend). The majority of academic staff has temporary work contracts. The salary scheme of the public sector is still applied to academic staff.
Italy	Status and seniority play a stronger role than performance and rewards to public service, in the frame of ministerial income schedules. Salary is fixed according to national regulation and it is the same for all universities and disciplines.	Marginal changes. Rector's salary can be increased, under Senato's and Consiglio's approvals. Specific rewards for extra-teaching or for administrative loads.
Netherlands	Seniority plays a much stronger role than performance. It determines pay scales and pay rises. Little additional income for taking up the temporary roles of dean or rector.	Salaries are based on nationally agreed scales but performance and market forces influence heavily initial scaling as well as pay rises, depending on institution's HRM which increasingly includes performance aspects. In certain areas/cases, salary additions to compensate for "market demand" are possible. HEI managers may have substantially higher incomes than teaching/research staff.
Norway	Merit based promotions of academics and administrative staff, depending on competitive evaluation of applications to vacant positions. Restricted differentiation and pay set according to a fixed bureaucratic scale, the same everywhere and in all discipline.	Idem, but increasing wage differentiation depending both on market situation and performance evaluation, and promotion to full professor increasingly after nationally organised individual evaluation of qualifications of applicants for promotion.
Switzerland	Promotion depends on status and seniority. Limited salary differentiation.	Idem. FIT develop flexibility to attract high flyers academics.
UK	Seniority plays a very important part in promotions, especially at the middle levels (senior lecturer).	More individually negotiated contracts at professorial level. Senior staff pays tend to be more differentiated and unequal (e.g., VCs). Experiments of performance based pay system are developed. Public service is less important than research performance in promotion.

THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION

	1980s	2000s
France	Weak professional organizations in HEIs, except in professional fields. Weak trade unions with power resulting from co-management on HR at the Ministry level. Direct relationship between the Ministry and disciplines, through national disciplinary expert groups or influential individual academics acting as advisers on HR and curricula. In research, specific management of HR and accreditation by powerful nationally elected disciplinary commissions based on a mix of union affiliation and scientific reputation.	More relationships between researchers and teachers with the increasing proportion of joint labs since the beginning of the 1990s. Evaluation of research centers, based on indicators and peer review, is transferred to the National evaluation agency (AERES, Research Pact 2006), LRU 2007), while individual researchers evaluation remains in the hand of research organizations. Evaluation of academics is expected to be developed. Evaluation of university departments is created and taken in charge by AERES (LRU 2007). Evaluation of teachers develops within individual universities.
Germany	Strong and influential professional organization of the professors ("Deutscher Hochschullehrerverband"/ DHV) in general. Labour unions don't play a role, other academic staff has no lobby. Strong presentation of academics in public funding agencies (DFG) and advisory bodies (WR). Disciplinary associations are not highly involved in policy making.	The power of the academic elite and the disciplinary associations increases since allocation decisions are more and more based on evaluations and funding shifts from recurrent funding of institutions to temporary and competitive funding of projects, making informed peer review necessary. Newly appointed professors can get object to regular evaluation of their performance since 1998 with parts of their recurrent funding depending on the results of such evaluations.
Italy	Disciplinary professional associations play a prominent role by influencing government decision making. University national council (CUN) is another relevant body representing all the HEIs on a disciplinary basis. CUN has a strong power advising the government for recruitment and curricula. Peer review and trade unions play a minor role.	Professional associations still important. New national representative bodies, especially the university rectors conference (CRUI) as a buffer between the government and universities. CUN composition is enlarged by including non academic members. Peer review, based on national panels, is growing, insuring the visibility of the universities and enlarging their influence on the government. Trade unions influence remains weak.
Netherlands	The Academic Council has lost its integrative power for the academic community. Peers review takes place in national research councils and disciplinary associations.	Disciplinary and professional associations have maintained their positions as forums for the (inter)discipline. Increasing role of external evaluation committees within the VSNU (since

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	1980s	2000s
Norway	Merit based promotions of academics and administrative staff, depending on competitive evaluation of applications to vacant positions. Restricted differentiation and pay set according to a fixed bureaucratic scale, the same everywhere and in all discipline.	Idem, but increasing wage differentiation depending both on market situation and performance evaluation, and promotion to full professor increasingly after nationally organised individual evaluation of qualifications of applicants for promotion.
Switzerland	Academic profession organized in broad disciplinary "academies". They support different disciplines by various means. In universities, major decisions taken by elected bodies that may include a various proportion of academics depending upon the issues.	No change, but peer review becoming more important in career evaluation.
UK	No major influence of professional associations or trade unions. TU must be consulted and may be included in the governance structure of universities. They try to counterweight decisions on restructuring and closures. Major influence of national disciplinary peer review through RAE, with indirect influence of academics as panel members and experts in advisory bodies.	No significant change apart from the erosion of the TU influence and representation. Peer review subject panels continue in RAE. Learned societies influence research policy (RAE review) and also protect their subjects by opposing plans for departmental closures (e.g., chemistry).

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (DECISION MAKING BODIES, ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION)

	1980s	2000s
France	Defined by Savary act (1984). 3 bodies with large formal largely fictive representation of stakeholders (academics, administrative staff, students, firms) (Board, scientific council, students life council)	Since the 1990s, presidents and VP more often elected as a presidential team that may gain some power of decision. The university bodies may work better. Functional administrative departments expand.

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	1980s	2000s
	+ President elected by the 3 bodies + VP + expanding functional administrative departments. Universities organized in UFR (sort of faculty) mono- or multidisciplinary, small or large, sometimes subdivided in departments, including doctorate, masters and research labs.	2002 no longer VSNU but under aegis of NVAO), with a new role for establishing the committees regarding performance by major research organizations. Increasing role of international publication and academic external visibility in identity building and career. LRU Act (2007) increases presidential authority, downsizes and empowers Boards. President as well as most members of Boards remain elected. Scientific council and students' life council are restrained to an advisory role.
Germany	Defined by Federal Framework Law. All leadership positions are elected by and held by academics from the respective university. The rector represents the university as a corporate body of academics while the chancellor – as the head of administration – represents the university as a public service entity. The chancellor is responsible for financial and administrative decisions and is member of the rectorate. The senate represents professors, other academic and technical staff and the students and decides on all major issues of the university. Professors keep a majority in all issues concerning teaching and research. Faculties are organized accordingly, with deans being professors elected by their colleagues.	Boards of Trustees have been introduced in many cases, which work closely with the rectorate/president. The role of the senates has been weakened from decision making to only advisory function. Rectors and deans have been granted more rights to regulate and allocate resources. All 16 state laws have somewhat different regulations in this respect.
Italy	Defined by law. Rector (the head of the university) elected by the university professors. Two government bodies: Senato (the professors' parliament) and Consiglio di amministrazione (board) with formal participation of representatives of stakeholders. Head of the administrative staff appointed by the Ministry. Departments as basic level for research coordination and management (1980).	Partly defined by the University statute (limitations from the national law). Government bodies substantially unchanged, but increasing role of Rectors. Senato includes students' representatives and Consiglio includes external stakeholders, which can influence decision-making. Units for evaluation (NUV-Nuclei di valutazione) introduced in all universities with a support staff. NUV's members appointed by the rector. Head of the administrative staff appointed by the rector and coordinated through a conference (CODAU).

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	1980s	2000s
Netherlands	By law, all universities are divided into faculties, faculties into departments. University Council, with representatives from academics (34%), students (32%) and technical & support staff (32%), controls Governing Board with many decision-making rights (model inspired on local council law). Governing Board consists of rector elected by and from academics, and 2 Ministerially-appointed members (president and vice-president). Similar in faculties: Council elected by staff (academic and technical & support) and students controls dean elected by academic staff.	Top oversight by Ministerially-appointed Board of Trustees (BoT). BoT appoints rector and other members of governing Board. Governing Board appoints deans. Representative bodies at university and faculty levels reduced to advisory powers mostly, as in companies. Seat distribution: staff 50% and students 50%. Institution itself decides on number of faculties and on lower-level units (departments are no longer prescribed).
Norway	Defined by separate laws for each university and specialized university institution and one common legislation for regional colleges. University institutions organized with elected leaders at all levels (rector, dean, department head, and parallel but subordinate administrative positions), and elected governing bodies controlled by the academic staff: The Academic Collegium, faculty councils and department councils. The College sector following partially same pattern, but under stronger regional political influence on institutional board.	Common legislation for the public higher education sector leaves choice of internal organization to institutions. The majority have an elected rectors and appointed academic leaders at lower levels. All major stakeholders, academic and administrative staff, students and external representatives are represented on institutional boards, but no single group have a majority.
Switzerland	Internal organization defined by cantonal university laws. Universities councils' compositions vary according to HEIs. Nominated rectors/presidents and bodies (commissions representing academics, administrative staff, students, firms). By comparison the FIT have a more powerful direction. But in both cases, participatory procedure exists.	In the last years, the cantonal authorities give more power to the direction to manage the academic life.

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	1980s	2000s
UK	No law. Each university's governance is specified in the Charter and Statutes held from the Privy Council. Typically there is a non executive Council, a VC and senior management team, faculties and department. Vice chancellors appointed by Council and not elected.	No major shifts. Appointments rather than elections of senior management staff continue. Some attempts to increase the strategic role of Councils and to develop senior level leadership (via the new Leadership Foundation in HE).

ORGANIZATION OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH

	1980s	2000s
France	Decisions on curricula at the department level, very rarely filtrated by the university level, examined by the academic experts of the Ministry. Ministry makes final accreditation. National programmes and individual decisions are the main drivers on research priorities.	No change at college level. The so-called UFRs (Unité de Formation et de Recherche, usually grouping several disciplinary entities) restricted to teaching missions. Masters still belong to UFRs, but are based on research centres. Autonomy of doctoral education from UFR. It is organized in doctoral schools based on research centres consortia outside UFR. University bodies act as gatekeepers of the ministry on curricula and recruitment by UFRs and DSs. Rationalization and harmonization of research priorities at the level of universities within the four-year contracts.
Germany	Teaching hours are regulated by Federal Framework Law. Research is not regulated within universities and left to the individual decision making of researchers. Decisions on curricula are taken on institute and faculty level and have to be approved by the state ministry. Doctorates are usually organized as an individual master-apprentice-relationship.	Teaching hours were increased by Federal Framework Law in 1998. Research is still not strictly regulated within universities but object to target agreements and research output of newly appointed professors can be evaluated. Many universities give their researchers incentives to develop proposals for large collaborative research grants from the EU or the DFG. The "excellence initiative" too turned research in many universities and disciplines from an individual to a collective venture. Doctorates are transformed from individual to collective in graduate or doctoral schools including regular study courses on doctoral level.

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	1980s	2000s
Italy	Curricula accreditation by Ministry based on CUN advices. Little differentiation between universities due to the lack of organizational autonomy. Teaching organized within faculty. Professors free to determine their own agenda, set priorities and manage. Low implementation of departments within the university system. Doctorates as first level of the research career (1980).	Universities gain substantial autonomy. Faculties remain the teaching management level, defining curricula under a set of minimum accreditation requirements defined by the ministry, based on CNVSU recommendations checking for teaching coverage. Incentives for creation of doctoral school (with autonomous management, co-ordination of courses, interdisciplinary studies), which should progressively replace doctoral courses. High degree of individual freedom in research, but expanding departments (co-funding projects and purchasing equipment), co-funding European project by executive organs of the university, external providers (firms, public or local bodies).
Netherlands	Universities organized into faculties and departments (disciplinary fields and subfields) with much autonomy regarding teaching and research. Not much direction at university level. Autonomous decisions on curriculum change in existing programmes by its professors. Establishment of new programmes under control of a national academic council, checking academic level. Research is the professor's prerogative.	Organisational autonomy of HEI. Faculties/schools organise education (bachelor + master + Ph.D.). Faculties and lower-level units tend to remain defined by disciplines, but less strictly so than until 1980s. In a few universities, institution-wide 'colleges' exist for broad liberal arts bachelor programmes aimed at internationally-recruited top students. Curriculum design is in the hands of middle managers (programme directors, deans). Less national control over new curricula but regular checks through NVAO's accreditation, controlled by academics. Doctoral schools, organised nationally since 1990s, mostly disintegrated to Ph.D. training in faculties. Research programming in the hands of middle managers (scientific directors of institutes, deans). Growth of research institutes as separate units inside/across faculties; many different organisational models exist as this is institution's autonomy.

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	1980s	2000s
Norway	Universities and some colleges organized teaching and research in faculties and departments as tenured academic staff is supposed to devote equally much time to teaching and research. Departments predominantly disciplinary in the sciences, humanities and social sciences, although some were pluri-disciplinary and divided into disciplinary subsections. Decisions on curricula made by departments, to be finally approved by the Ministry. Research priorities are tied to ministerial research programs and national programs under the research councils. Research centres started to emerge partly alongside departments within universities and partly as separate organizational entities owned by universities partly funded by publicly funded research programs, partly by commissioned research.	Same organisational structure. But tendency to merge disciplinary departments into larger multidisciplinary departments (1990–2003). Responsibility for teaching programs moved to program boards where several disciplines and departments may cooperate (2003). Faculties or institutions decide on curricula and must be approved in some cases by the ministry. Doctoral schools organizing within faculties. Approval from ministry now needed for master and doctoral studies offered by institutions that are not yet accredited as universities. An institution need to have minimum five master programs and four doctoral programs in order to qualify for accreditation which is carried out by NOKUT (2005). Tendency to organize in thematic research groups (2003), within or across disciplines. Many research centres established for externally funded research often organised within larger research organisations owned by universities. Research priorities are made at several levels (EU, national government, individual ministries, research councils, HEI).
Switzerland	Universities organized at the faculty and/or department level. Not many prerogatives at the direction of universities level. Decisions on teaching activities often taken in commissions at the faculty and/or department level. However, decisions on curricula are managed by the HEI except for medicine. Generally, prevalence of the principle of the unit of teaching and research. Organization of research based on chairs in social and human sciences, on research teams in natural sciences. No national research priorities, but the historical distinction between Federal Institutes of Technology and universities applies.	Introduction in most universities of the Bologna rules, which intervene on the curricula, the duration of the degree, the exams, etc. Mostly, universities can prioritize research by themselves. However, they are also determined by local, national and international contexts, including the funding possibilities. Department, faculty commission and the HERI direction set more and more research priorities, while professors' freedom regresses.

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	1980s	2000s
UK	Faculties and departments as internal levels of teaching and research organisation. Below "subject groups" may organise teaching and some research centres. No formal Doctoral School. Few research 'labs' located outside university structures. Decisions on curricula are in the hands of professors, and typically are agreed by internal university teaching committees, with advice from external academics. Vocational degrees may also be accredited by outside bodies. Research priorities determined at individual level. Research councils influenced the choices through call for proposals.	Some faculties and departments have moved to a single intermediate layer – the school –bringing together departments in a multidisciplinary arena. No major change for decisions on curricula. Internal university pressures to remove low enrolment courses and to secure less fragmentation of teaching arrangements. Formal doctoral schools located within university structures. Individual academics remain important to determine research priorities. But under pressure of RAE toward a more strategic management of research priorities, growth of large multi disciplinary collaborations and collective research centres.

UNIVERSITY LEADERS AND MANAGERS

	1980s	2000s
France	Heads of university and faculties are academics accepting the job with no counterpart as a temporary and usually additional occupation (presidents owe half of a professor's teaching obligation). Weak leadership based on consensus building, in spite of the university reorganizations (1968, 1984): national steering schemes and tools focus on disciplines rather than universities; unclear jurisdiction divide between presidents and university bodies; very narrow corridors of action for university leaders. Senior administrative staff selected by the university among candidates on a national list. Contrast with appointed public GE directors with real authority. Very small and weak management level, strong role played by academics in management.	No change in statutes. Leaders still elected academics. Authority of presidents increases strongly with LRU (2007). Leadership gains recognition, from the president to faculty directors (reduction of teaching load and financial rewards). Recognition of the university leadership and rising coordination between presidents as political actors and managers through their national Conference (CPU). Development and diversification of professional management by administrative staffs, by training and coordination by professional associations.

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	1980s	2000s
Germany	All leadership positions are elected by and held by academics from the respective university. The rector represents the university as a corporate body of academics while the chancellor – as the head of administration – represents the university as a public service entity. The chancellor is responsible for financial and administrative decisions and is member of the rectorate. Deans are elected among their peers in the faculties. Members of the rectorate and deans usually serve for 4 years and then return to their chairs. Accordingly their leadership remains weak and is focused on consent decision making. Line item budgeting and state approval of recruitment decisions leave no leeway for autonomous decisions.	In many cases presidents and rectors can now be appointed from outside the university and must not necessarily have the status as a full professor (although most of them still are members of the academic profession). The tandem of rectorate and board of trustees is principally in many states and universities empowered to take top down decisions without the consent of collegial bodies. However, they usually don't act that way. With the change from line item- to lump sum budgeting rectors/presidents and deans have more leeway for decisions concerning structures and resource allocation. Recruitment policy is now a task where rectorates, trustees and deans are heavily involved.
Italy	Rector and most members of governing bodies (Senato academico, Consiglio) elected by professors. Weak leadership based on consensus building. Management level very small and weak, strong role played by academics in management. The head of the administrative staff is a bureaucrat appointed by the Ministry, and has a dominant position as compared to the rector. He handles relationships to ministry, while the rector links to the political arena.	Same situation. But the rector's power has significantly increased in some cases, mainly through the use of steering tools (new governance arrangements, evaluation practices, funding rules). The rector links to the political arena, with the help of the CRUI. Head of the administrative staff appointed by the rector, who has lost his power to link with the ministry but increased their internal managerial power. Coordination through a conference (CODAU). Creation of foundations in some universities to improve education and research by catching new resources, improve management and facilitate interactions with external actors.
Netherlands	The elected rector works in close connection with the M. of education. No effective collective actor like Conference of rectors at the national level.	A new vertical system based on appointment replaces the old representative system. Board of Trustees appoints the rector and other members of the governing board, which in turn appoints the deans and other

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	1980s	2000s
	Senior administrative staff selected by the university.	academic managers. Tendency towards stronger rectors and presidents. Increasing importance of the central management. Administrative staff: no major change. Universities have developed an association (teaching: 1988–2002; research: 1993–now), HRM (1997–now), and lobbying. Governmental steering moves towards more competition and institutional mission diversification. State has few ex ante control but increases ex post control. The number of stakeholders increases.
Norway	Shared leadership and elected leaders. University rectors are institutional integrators lending academic legitimacy to university decisions. Directors generally handle relationship to ministry and politicians. Elected decision making bodies embed most levels of academic staff, administrative staff, and students.	Strengthening of internal decision-making hierarchy by introduction of appointed leaders at faculty and department level, replacement of elected decision making bodies by advisory boards (2005). Partial decentralization of authority at the department level and strengthening of department leadership. Gradual transition from ex ante to ex post control. Gradual devolution of authority to the institutions.
Switzerland	Rectors are appointed with limited leadership except for the FIT presidents. Elected commissions embed most levels of academic and administrative staff and students. Two agencies in charge of coordination; the conference of Swiss universities (gathering public authorities at all levels) and the conference of rectors of the Swiss universities and FIT.	The Swiss Confederation encourages reinforcing steering by tools set by various public authorities in charge of HE. Some rectors gain power of managing budgets. Acting as buffers between deans and public authorities, they may reinforce the university as an organization.
UK	University leadership shared by non executive council, vice chancellor, senior management team and (academic) Senate. Sometimes successful attempts of the government to increase managerial role of vice chancellor (on a CEO type model) by adopting a more private sector orientation in management.	Shift from election to appointment at senior posts. Power shift upwards from rank and file academics and senate to VC and senior management teams, at various degrees across universities. Strong VCs rather common.

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	1980s	2000s
	Administrative staff are selected by the university and headed by a registrar. Parallel hierarchy to the academic domain. They maintain a facilitative rather than directing role.	Heading departments becomes more demanding. Administrative staff: no major change. National agencies are set up in order to improve HE leadership capabilities (Leadership foundation for HE).

NARRATIVE AND IDEOLOGY CARRIERS

Reformist Policy Doctrines/Narratives

	1980s	2000s
France	The 1984 act aims at democratizing the university governing structure. Failure to annihilate this reform by reinforcing the power of professors. No governance narrative outside traditional free welfare good and democratic ideology ("liberté, égalité, fraternité") but emergence of the notion of assessment (with the CNE for instance, the research contracts, etc.) without explicit (and little implicit) implications in terms of funding.	Reforms are led but they are not inspired by the NPM or governance rhetoric until the mid 2000s. Yet, new concepts such as performance, evaluation, assessment, and third mission shape the policy doctrine. Need of autonomy claimed as necessary for flexibility and reactivity in front of new requirements of knowledge society, based on transfer of micromanagement of individual universities, new organisational opportunities, mostly by networking in PRES or RTRA, and increased opportunities of industry–research cooperation (Pôles de compétitivité, institutes Carnot).
Germany	The dominant idea of the German university is teaching and research in "Solitude and Freedom" which means a strong self-governance of universities by the academic oligarchy under the supervision of and financial support by the state. With the latter not intervening in questions concerning teaching and research. However, the political call for "relevance" of teaching and research gets louder in the 80s.	Since the reform of the Federal Framework Law on HE in 1998 all reform attempts operate under the key word "more autonomy". The NPM narrative is implicitly hidden in the political call for universities autonomy or "the unchaining of the university" but not explicitly used because of the strong resistance it provokes among the majority of professors.
Italy	No consistent narrative on HE reform, neither relevant experiences. Autonomy of Universities is the major objective to be achieved. Governance is not the core of the debate, which remains ideological and bounded to the continental model of HE.	Principles of NPM governance gain a prominent position (end of 90s). They impact policy practice through measures aimed toward modernization, using funding and evaluation as main instruments.

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	1980s	2000s
Netherlands	Expansion toward mass higher education is the main axiom. Democracy (a la 1960s) is the main ideology until early 1980s. The government introduces the concept of "steering from a distance" (1985), in which the principles of regulation, planning mechanisms, government coordination, were meant to be replaced by a philosophy of a government confined to setting boundaries and strategic dialogue between minister and HEIs, with evaluation of performance as major feedback mechanism.	Self-regulation diminished in favour of "good governance". Shift of attention from vertical relationship (state–HEI) to horizontal accountability (to social stakeholders). "Entrepreneurialism" and "consumerism" become important metaphors in the 1990s, in the frame of neo-liberal ideology. Ambiguity/conflicting political values: equity of access, HE as a public good (uniform fees), autonomy of HEI as non-profit enterprises, vs. HE as a private good for students, HE as a private good on a global market for services, state's interest in macro-economic growth.
Norway	Policies defined regarding perceived national labour market needs. Focus on educational efficiency, vocationally oriented teaching program and applied research. Federal government and administrative bodies are considered as coordinators of national policy.	The role of the government remains unchallenged. But rhetoric shift from HE as a welfare good to some efficiency concerns, connected with the emphasis on HE&R as economic growth factor and as political tools for internationalization and globalization. In line with: introduction of activity planning in 1989; use of European frameworks as crucial justification for the debated 2002 Quality Reform; university and college act (2005) giving more autonomy to institutions; strengthening of external representation on institution boards but markets or third sector not emphasized. "Competition and Cooperation" becomes the leit-motif.
UK	Era of Thatcherism. Policy narrative dominated by NPM but with a lower direct control than in other public sectors. Principles of value for money, efficiency and productivity are stressed. In 1989 an attempt to introduce quasi market in HE fails. Universities are still publicly funded. UGC control over funding allocation is enforced though the RAE. Senior management is empowered and local participation to the HE government removed (reform of Polytechnics)	Era of New Labour. NPM moves towards a more hybrid governance model. Key aspects of the Thatcherian period are reinforced (RAE, QAA and top up student fees). Participation of civil society and social inclusion are now pursued. In the second period of the New Labour the government NPM rhetoric is revitalised but modernisation tends to be paired with new concepts on diversity and choice (student satisfaction surveys, audit systems, inter HEI networking).

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	1980s	2000s
		New emphasis on university cooperation rather than competition. Sub-national government levels tend to diversify HE policies. A certain policy orientation toward enhancing democratic participation.

NARRATIVES BEARERS

	1980s	2000s
France	Strong political role of the Ministry and the central level Reformist politicians and academics play a role of advisors at the ministry level. The long lasting rhetoric of crisis of French universities is reactivated in the media with a large contribution of intellectuals.	Apart from politicians and academics, new institutions and collective actors play a role as reform vectors at national level (CPU, the ministry of finance) and international level (EU, OECD).
Germany	Strong consent of academics and politicians on the freedom of teaching and research and about public funding with no strings attached. This consent breaks up by the middle of the eighties but could be renewed through the circumstances of the German unification, where the old system was completely transferred to and established in East Germany. The massification of university education started to become a big issue in the 1980s, forcing the federal ministry to intervene with succeeding temporary programs.	Although universities are financed and under the jurisdiction of the states the Federal ministry of education and research has played the part of a major promoter of reforms, using the possibilities of framework legislation (until recently), project and program funding, the Bologna Process, salary issues and last but not least the "excellence initiative". Some states like Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and recently Northrhine-Westphalia play the role of forerunners with regard to innovative HE legislation. The Wissenschaftsrat (WR) – an intermediary advisory body – gives reports and policy advice to shape the HE-agenda. Civil society actors – usually foundations supported by influential industrial or commercial organizations – were successful lobbyists, agenda setters and resource providers for NPM-like reforms in the HE-systems. Such foundations are: The "Centrum fuer Hochschulentwicklung" (CHE), the "Volkswagen-Stiftung" and the "Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft".

(continued)

	1980s	2000s
Italy	The Ministry shapes the reform design of 1980. Academics influence narratives and ideologies as well as politicians, in particular the Advisory Disciplinary Committees within CNR, and CUN.	The Bologna process promotes HE reform. Implementation by the Ministry, with the help of CUN, CRUI, Cultural Commissions of the Parliament, CNR and other major public research agencies, and additional information provided by CNVSU. The role of academics is still very important; they are prestigious consultant, chief of institutional bodies and counterpart in the debate. The minister is often a professor.
Netherlands	Important role of Intelligentsia after 1968, slow decline after 1977. Reform-oriented politicians (Labour Party) mix with intelligentsia. Early 80s: a minister of education and a senior civil servant shake up higher education and begin major top-down reforms.	At national level, the ministry steers reform, following neo-liberal/neo-conservative main lines. Parliament is open to lobbying by national student unions and HEI lobbying clubs, and has a general control-oriented outlook. Individual academics open major new avenues (university leaders). HEI managers influence institution's profile.
Norway	Politicians, officials at the National directorate for civil service organizational development, university administrators. Academics, national level media.	Politicians, unions and academics in the press and in books. Rectors, individually and collectively have become important players. National level media.
Switzerland	Politicians and administrators at Federal level.	Funding agencies such as FNS contributed to the production of such kind of discourse, especially in terms of network and accountability. But also the state secretary for adaptation to the European scheme. Besides them, politicians and administrators at federal and cantonal levels. Experts in HER policy studies.
UK	No clear division of tasks between different levels of power. Attempts of the central department to influence all the spending departments (including education). At the local level the role of VCs is relevant. Closed policy networks and guru play an important role.	The Third Way ideology does not clarify who is in charge to down the policy narratives to specific HE reforming. Key thinkers contribute to stress concepts such as "knowledge based economy". VCs remain important for reform implementation at local level.

MAJOR QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA

	1980s	2000s
France	Mainly on organization statutes, massification and integration of human resources in the civil service.	Interdependency of all dimensions of universities on performance (missions, funding, organization, human resources, control). Ability of presidential teams to sustain individual university autonomy. Relationship between research organizations and universities.
Germany	Massification of university education. Missing relevance of university curricula and research for economical purposes.	Enrolment rates should be further increased to international level. Funding gets more dependent on performance, measured in quantitative indicators. Regional overcapacities in certain disciplines and institutes with low student demand are reduced. Increasing efforts in internationalization. Emphasis on "excellence" in research and increasing importance of third party funding. Trend towards the rewarding of big, collaborative research projects. Introduction of efficient and effective management and governance-structures in universities.
Italy	Need to increase the system capability to face massification and increase external resources.	Problems of self-financing. Capabilities of universities to promote economic development. Strong attention to the productivity of the system, both quantitative (graduates number, CFU, students) and qualitative (research evaluation, VTR). Rising attention to third mission.
Netherlands	Need to increase the system capability to face massification and increase external resources. In the 80s, discussion on merger policy, quality assessment in return for institutional autonomy.	In the 1990s: institutional management, diversification of institutional missions. In the 2000s: Bologna process/ adaptation to European standards and – increasingly important – Lisbon strategy.
Norway	Resources and funding. From the late 80's, on the steering organization. Activity planning and department mergers.	Emphasis on efficiency, organization, funding models and internationalization.
Switzerland	Site concentration, task sharing, and role of the Confederation. Nothing done in practice.	The principle of competition and cooperation.

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